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CORPORATE LOANS TO DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS: 
EVERY BUSINESS NOW A BANK? 
JAYNE W. BARNARD* 
In most states, a corporation may loan money to an officer or director if the 
board of directors authorizes the loan and finds that it will "benefit" the corporation. 
According to Professor Jayne W. Barnard, however, this benefit requirement has 
proved to.be an illusory standard. Barnard reviews existing law on the subject and 
surveys the·executive lending practices of 152 publicly held corporations. She con-
cludes that executive loan enabling statutes have failed to consider the risks involved 
in making such loans, such as illiquidity, inadequate collateralization, inclination to 
default, and volatility of the economy. As a result, current laws permit the diversion 
of corporate resources to nonproductive uses and encourage the overcompensation 
of certain executives. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For many years, corporations were prohibited by law from making 
loans to their officers and directors. An example appears in the original 
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), 1 which provided simply 
that "11-o loans shall be made by a corporation to its officers or directors, 
and no loans shall be made by a corporation secured by its shares." 2 
Even Delaware's Corporation Law prohibited loans to corporate man-
agers. 3 These widely accepted prohibitions were designed "to protect 
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & 
Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. I am grateful to many people for their assistance in the preparation 
of this Article. Tim Clark of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. provided the proxy materials upon which 
the executive loan empirical study is based. Larry Schimmels, a second-year law student at William 
& Mary, and Theresa Schmid, our Reference Librarian, each provided research support. Kate 
Marriott, Cha.rles Koch, Paul Lebel, Judith Ledbetter, and Ingrid Hillinger each contributed 
insights distinctive to their fields, as did my husband, John Tucker. The research was funded, in 
part, by a summer research grant from the College of William & Mary. 
I. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1946). 
2. /d. at§ 42. This language remained in effect until 1969. See infra note 39. As strict as 
it was, this initial formulation was still criticized for not clearly prohibiting various subterfuges 
with the practical effect of permitting extra-compensatory financial assistance to corporate manag-
ers. See Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 199-200 (1958). 
3. The Delaware General Corporation Law of 1915 provided: "No corporation created 
under this Chapter shall make any loan of money to any officer of such corporation, nor shall any 
loan be made to a stockholder upon the security of the stock of the corporation .... " 65 DEL. REv. 
CODE§ 1950 (1915) quoted in Graham v. Young, 35 Del. 484, 485-86, 167 A. 906, 907 (1933). 
Already by 1915 Delaware's corporation statute was "commonly regarded as a modern and 'lib-
eral' act." Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,664-
65 (1974). The General Corporation Law later provided "No loans shall be made by a corporation 
237 
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the interests of creditors, to prevent impairment of corporate resources 
and to prohibit use of corporate assets by management for private 
purposes. " 4 
Today, only four states maintain the statutory prohibition against 
executive loans by domiciliary corporations. 5 With the competitive 
"modernization" of corporate law by the states, these prohibitions 
have elsewhere been replaced by a variety of enabling responses, which 
are summarized in Appendix I of this Article. 
Six states now permit executive loans where there has been express 
shareholder approval. 6 Twenty-nine states expressly permit executive 
loans where authorized by the board of directors. Most of these, includ-
ing Delaware, merely require the board to find that making the loan will 
to its officers or directors, and no loans shall be made by a corporation secured by its shares .... " 
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 143 (1953), quoted in Maclary v. Pleasant Hills, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 39, 47 n.2, 
109 A.2d 830, 836 n.2 (1954). · · 
4. I MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN.§ 42, comment 4 (1960). See Wulfjen v. Dolton, 
24 Cal. 2d 878, 888, !51 P.2d 840, 845 (Cal. 1944) (California statute prohibiting executive loans 
"was enacted to prevent directors from taking advantage of their position to grant themselves or 
their colleagues unwarranted loans, and thus dissipate corporate funds in violation of their 
trust."). 
5. ALASKA STAT.§ 10.05.213 (1987) (loans to officers or directors prohibited); D.C. 
CODE ANN.§ 29-304(6) (1981) (same); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 21-2045 (1983) (same); Arkansas with-
holds authority for many of its domiciliary corporations to "enter into contracts of guaranty of 
suretyship or make other financial arrangements ... for the benefit of ... its employees [where such 
employees are also} officer[s] or director[s] or any person holding as much as 10% of the shares 
entitled to vote for the election of directors." ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 4-26-204(b)(3) ( 1987) (applicable 
to corporations formed before Dec. 31, 1987). Several states, while not expressly prohibiting exec-
utive loans, presumably discourage them by imposing personal liability on directors who approve 
such loans. E.g .. CAL. CoRP. CoDE§ 316 (West 1987); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 33-32I(c) (West 
1987); D.C. CoDE ANN.§ 29-342 (1981); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 62 (West Supp. 1987); 
Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 351.165 (Vernon Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:6-ll (West Supp. 1986); 
OHio REv. CODE ANN.§ 1701.95 (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1986); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 
23A.08.450(2) (Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT.§ 180.40(l)(d) (1985-1986). 
The United Kingdom prohibits most corporate loans and guarantees of loans made by 
others ·to directors. Companies Act § 330 ( 1985). Canada prohibits loans or "any financial assis-
tance" to shareholders or directors, with limited exceptions. R.S.C. § C-32 § C-32 § 17(1) (1970). 
Congress has prohibited executive loans in a number of federally chartered corporations. See, e.g., 
36 U.S.C. § 234 (1981) (Reserve Officers' Association); 36 U.S.C. § 415 (198 I) (Conference of State 
Societies); 36 U.S.C. § 439(b) (1981) (Conference of Citizenship); 36 U.S.C. § 579(b) (198 I) (Fed-
eral Bar Association). 
6. CAL. CORP. CoDE§ 315 (West Supp. 1987) (corporations with less than 100 share-
holders prohibited from making loans to officers or directors unless the loan or an authorized 
employee benefit plan is approved by the shareholders); CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 7-3-101(1)(1) (1986) 
(requires affirmative 2/3 vote of shareholders to authorize a loan to a director, unless articles of 
incorporation dictate otherwise); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:6-ll (West Supp. 1986) (loans to directors 
are limited to those granted pursuant to employee benefit plans adopted by the shareholders or 
reflected in the certificate of incorporation or by-laws adopted by the shareholders); N.Y. Bus. 
CoRP. LAw§ 714 (McKinney 1986) (any loan to a director must be approved by the shareholders); 
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 55-22 (1983) (any loan to a director, officer or dominant shareholder must be 
approved by the shareholders); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 16-10-43 (1987) (loans to directors or officers 
require consent of the shareholders). 
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provide some "benefit" to the corporation. 7 Eight states, either ex-
pressly or implicitly, have abandoned all limitations on executive 
loans. 8 
This Article looks critically at the statutes which have authorized 
executive loans, and the loan:.making experience of corporations in re-
cent years. It focuses in particular on the "benefit" standard for execu-
tive loans which has been adopted in twenty-eight states. When is a loan 
made to a corporate director to the exclusion of other corporate oppor-
tunities deemed to be "beneficial" to the corporation? By what stan-
dards should this determination be made and, if challenged, reviewed? 
Because there is little case law in this area;9 corporate directors called 
upon to make such a determination have been forced to act without 
guidance, with predictably self-serving results. 
7. The Delaware General Corporation Law curren-tly provides: 
Any corporation may lend money to, or guarantee any obligation of, or otherwise 
assist any officer or other employee of the corpor~tion or of its subsidiary, including any 
officer or employee who is a director of the corporation or its subsidiary, whenever in the 
judgment of the directors, such loan, guaranty or assistance may reasonably be expected 
to benefit the corporation .. .. 
DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (1983). See also ALA. CooE§ 10-2A-69 (1987); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 10-047 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 4-27-302 (.1987) (applicable to corporations formed after Dec. 
31, 1987 and corporations formed before that date which elect coverage unde~ the BUSINESS CoR-
PORATION AcT OF 1987); CAL. CoRP. CooE § 315 (West Supp. 1987) (applies only to corporations 
with 100 or more shareholders which have adopted a charter provision authorizing board ap-
proval, and also applies only to loans to officers, not directors); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 607.141 (West 
Supp. 1987); IDAHO CooE § 30-1-47 (1980); IND. CooE ANN. § 23-1-35-3 (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA 
CooE ANN. § 496A.4.6 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-6303 (1981); Kv. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 271A.235 (MichiejBobbs-Merri111981); Mo. CoRPS. & Ass'NsCooE ANN.§ 2-416 (1985); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1548 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 302A.501 (West 1985); 
MoNT. CooE ANN. § 35-1-415 (1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:47 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. 
ANN.§ 14A:6-Il (West Supp ... l986) (statute also requires, in the case of loans to directors, that 
they be made pursuant to a provision in the certificate of incorporation, by-laws approved by the 
shareholders or a plan adopted by the shareholders); N.D. CENT. CooE § 10-19.1"89 (1985); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 118, § 1029 (1984); OR. REV. STAT.§ 57.226 (1983); R .I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-1.1-42 
(1985); S.C . CooE ANN. § 33-13-170 (Law. Co-op 1987); S.D. Cot;>IFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-65 
(1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-303 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.445 (Supp. 
1987); W. VA. CooE § 31-1-101 (1982); Wvo. STAT. § 17-1-140.1 (Supp. 1986). 
Georgia requires director approval for executive loans, but. imposes no "benefit" require-
ment. GA. CooE ANN. § 14-5-5 (1982). Texas imposes a benefit requirement, but fails to -specify 
director approval. TEx. Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. art. 2.02(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987). Massachusetts 
absolves authorizing directors of personal liability for unrepaid loans where they have approved or 
ratified them based upon a finding of corporate "benefit." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 62 
(West Supp. 1987). Connecticut absolves its directors where the loan was made "primarily for a 
legitimate business purpose of the corporation." CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 33-321(c) (West 1987). 
8. Express authority: HAW. REv. STAT.§ 416-26(7) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para 
3.10(f) (Smith-Hurd 1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A. § 202(1)(m) (1981); MISS. CooE ANN. 
§ 79-4-3 .02 (Supp. 1987); N .M. STAT. ANN. § 53-ll-4F (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. II,§ 1852(6) 
(1984). Implied authority: 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit.l5, § 1302(9) (Purdon Supp. 1987); VA. 
CooE ANN. § 13.1-627 (Supp. 1985). 
9. See infra notes 87-96, 98 and accompanying text. 
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The author recently reviewed the proxy statements of fifty-five 
publicly traded American corporations which had extended substantial 
loans to or maintained substantial credit relationships with their execu-
tives in fiscal year 1986. This Article explores the purposes for and the 
terms of the loans made. and weighs these experiences against various 
concepts of corporate "benefit." The Article concludes that, as cur-
rently viewed by corporate management, the so-called "benefit" limita-
tions on loans to directors and officers imposed by the majority of the 
state enabling statutes are illusory. . 
In effect, the enabling statutes, while purporting to impose limita-
tions on the circumstances in which executive loans are permissible, 
have created a standardless atmosphere in which those loans are freely 
made. And by encouraging the making of executive loans, these stat-
utes have provided managers with their most accessible mechanism for 
implementing the "agency problem." 10 
Given especially the recent experiences of regulated financial insti-
tutions with excessive grants of insider loans-now recognized as a 
principal predictor of bank insolvency 11 -the executive loan enabling 
statutes, aimed at wholly unregulated and inexperienced lenders, war-
rant thoughtful reconsideration. 
II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INSIDER LoANS 
Early corporate law was straightforward: Unless a corporation 
lent money as its regular business, it was prohibited from making loans. 
"In most cases," one early commentator pointed out, 
the business of a corporation is to invest and use its capital 
and not to loan it out. Accordingly, it is well settled that only 
where the business of the corporation is such as usually in-
volves loaning does the corporation have the right to loan its 
funds. 12 
10. Professor Brudney has characterized the "agency problem" as the "temptation [of 
corporate management] to shirk in its performance or to divert corporate assets to itself .... " 
Brudney, Corporate Governance. Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract. 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 
1403, 1406 (1985). "An important factor in the survival of organizational forms is control of 
agency problems." Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims. 26 J. L. & EcoN. 327 
(1983). 
II. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
12. 2 W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES AND 
GENERAL CORPORATION LAw 982 (3d ed. 1894). See also Leigh v. American Brake Beam Co., 205 
Ill. 147, 151, 68 N.E. 713, 715 (1903) ("A corporation cannot make loans of money unless the 
exercise of its chartered powers ordinarily includes such loans. The business of this corporation 
was to invest and use its capital in making and selling brake beams and other railroad appliances 
and to distribute its profits as dividends, and it had no power to loan its money or capital."). 
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This view was later modified by the recognition that a business 
sometimes had to lend money, or extend credit to its customers, in .or-
der to succeed in the marketplace. Like the implied power to borrow 
money in aid of express corporate powers, corporations were found to 
have an implied power to lend under.limited circumstan<~es: 
Thus, a water company may make advances to a contractor to 
enable him to construct its works~ or to another company en-
gaged in constructing ditches and laying pipes, in order to ob-
tain an additional supply of water required by it; a mining 
· company may advance money to a tunnel company to put in 
drains which will aid the lender in drawing water from its 
mine; and a ·warehouse company may advance money to 
growers of the product stored with it, or in which it deals. 13 
The guiding principle, however, was that the power to ma~e loans 
was only incidental to the corporation's express powers, and therefore a 
non-bank corporation could not make loans other than to advance the 
limited business purpose for which it had been created. 14 In addition, a 
corporation could purchase short-term debt instruments, but only as a 
means of gaining a return on surplus funds. 15 
A few courts, broadly construing these impiied corporate powers, 
permitted loans to directors or officers where there was no fraud and no 
showing that the funds could have been invested at a more substantial 
interest yield. 16 Most states, however, took a more conservative view. 
From very early in the development of state chartering laws, corporate 
statutes either forbade the grant of executive loans altogether, 17 or cre-
ated substantial disincentives by enSuring that creditors of corporations 
whose directors approved such loans had recourse against the approv-
ing officials in the event the loans remained unpaid. 18 These early provi-
13. 6 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 2619 (rev. 
perm. ed. 1979). 
14. /d. Of course, corporations whose normal line of business was banking were empow-
ered to make loans to their directors. See, e.g., Lindemann v. Rusk, 125 Wis. 210, 104 N.W. 119 
( 1905). 
15. 6 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at§ 2620; Garrison Canning Co. v. Stanley, 133 Iowa 
57, 110 N.W. 171 (1907). 
16. Felsenheld v. Block Bros. Tobacco Co., 119 W. Va. 167, 176, 192 S.E. 545, 549 
(1937). Perhaps it should be noted that West Virginia was kn·own to be a very pro-management 
jurisdiction at one time, referred to by some as the "Snug Harbor for roaming and piratical corpo-
rations" or the " Mecca of irresponsible corporations." 2 W. CooK, supra note 12, at 1604. 
17. See, e.g .. N.Y. LAw, ch. 40, § 14 (1848)("No loan of money shall be made by any ... 
company to any stockholder therein."), quoted in Nellis C:o. v. Nellis, 16 N.Y.S. 545, 547 (1891). 
"The principal object of that provision is to prevent a reducing of the capital under cover of loans 
to stockholders. It is intended for the protection of creditors." /d. 
18. See Annotation, Construction and Application of Statutes Making Corporate Officers 
or Directors Liable in Respect of Loans or Advances to Stockholders or Officers, 129 A.L.R. 1258 
( 1940). An early example of such a statute is MASS. GEN. L. ch. 106, § 60 (1882), which provided 
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sions derived from traditional trust principles 19 and represented a 
pointed response to the self-dealing excesses of the special charter 
experience. 20 
The state enactments took diverse forms over the years, with some 
prohibiting loans to directors and officers but not to shareholders and 
others prohibiting loans to shareholders but not to directors and of-
ficers. 21 One state prohibited loans to directors and shareholders but 
failed to regulate loans to officers, while two others prohibited loans to 
officers and shareholders, omitting any reference to directors. 22 
But regardless of the drafting idiosyncracies distinguishing them, 
the intent of the statutes prohibiting executive loans was clear. The 
rhetoric accompanying their enforcement was rich with references to 
"unscrupulous directors [with] the power to deplete the assets of a cor-
poration by borrowing money .... " 23 One commentator characterized 
these statutes as "the principal deterrent to a dissipation of corporate 
assets .... " 24 
Critics occasionally pointed to analytical deficiencies in the pro-
hibitory statutes, suggesting, for example, that if their intended purpose 
was protection against the dissipation of capital, such provisions were 
that a corporation's president and its directors would be jointly and severally liable "for debts 
contracted between the time of making or assenting to a loan to a stockholder and the time of its 
repayment, to the extent of such a loan." Old Colony Boot & Shoe Co. v. Parker-Sampson-Adams 
Co., 183 Mass. 557, 559, 67 N.E. 870, 871 (1903). Many statutes combined both a prohibition 
against , and director liability to ensure repayment of, executive loans. See, e.g., the 1848 New 
York statute, supra note 17, quoted in Nellis Co. v. Nellis, 16 N.Y .S. at 549: "No loan shall be 
made by [a] company to any stockholder therein; and if any such loan shall be made to a stock-
holder the officers who shall make it, or who shall assent thereto, shall be jointly and severally 
liable to the extent of such loan and interest for all debts contracted before the repayment of the 
sum so loaned." 
Maryland raised the stakes by providing that "no loan of money shall be made by any ... 
corporation to any stockholder therein, and that if any such loan shall be made to any stockholder 
the officer or officers who shall make it, or who shall assent thereto, shall be jointly and severally 
liable for all the debts of the corporation contracted before the making of said loan; to the extent of 
double the amount of said loan." Mo. ANN. CooE art. 23, § 69, quoted in Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 
245, 274-75. 48 A. 621 , 627 (1901). 
The issue most frequently arising out of such statutes was whether a particular officer of 
director had " assented" to the granting of the loan . See, e.g., Murray v. Smith, 224 N .Y. 40, 120 
N.E. 60 (1918). 
19. J . PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES§ 453 (2d ed. 1874). See 
Phillips, Managerial Misuse of Property: The Synthesizing Thread in Corporate Doctrine, 32 
RuTGERS L. REv. 184, 187-90 ( 1979). A seminal case articulating the application of trust principles 
to corporate conduct arose out of the extension of credit to a shareholder to enable him to pur-
chase his stock. Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45 (1875). 
20. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 446-47, 448-55 (1973). 
21. Rich, Corporate Loans to Officers, Directors and Shareholders, 14 Bus. LAW. 658.659 
( 1959). 
22. /d. 
23. Wulljen v. Dolton, 24 Cal. 2d 891,896, 151 P.2d 846,849 (Cal. 1944); In re Wood's 
Estate, 299 Mich. 635, 647, I N.W.2d 19, 24 (1941). 
24. Rich, supra note 21, at 658. 
HeinOnline -- 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 243 1988
1988:237 Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers 243 
overinclusive25 or, where their coverage excluded certain parties-for 
example, prohibiting loans to directors and officers, but not to share-
holders-they were underinclusive. 26 More pointedly, critics suggested 
that adoption of restrictions on executive loans added little to existing 
common law rights to recover in the event of managerial breach of the 
duty of care. 27 · 
To be sure, shareholders and creditors were not without remedy 
even where no prohibitory statutes existed. 28 Nonetheless, the prohibi-
tory statutes grew in popularity, particula,rly with. the circulation of the 
Model Business Corporation Act in 1946 and its adoption in 1950.29 
25. Comment, Corporations-General Effect of Statutes Prohibiting Corporate Loans to 
Directors, Officers and Stockholders, 48 MICH. L REV. 213, 215 (1949). 
26. /d. at 218. 
27. /d. at 214. 
28. E.g .. Milam v. Cooper, 258 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (defendant pur-
chased controlling share in corporation, paying for stock by tendering a $292,954 note secured by 
his shares and repayable in 15 years at 2%% interest; the note was approved by the board of 
directors; court found that the loan "was not incide!Jtal to or in furtherance of the purposes for 
which the corporation was organized, or even to the interest of the corporation, but to the contrary 
was a loan which was wholly and solely to the furtherance of Milam's personal interest, and ambi-
tion to control [the company]"; Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & White Lime Co., 334 Mo. 319, 
66 S.W.2d 889 (1933) (director/general manager took interest-free loan from company in order to 
acquire stock, without authority and without the knowledge of the directors or stockholders. Even 
though the loans were later repaid, court requires an accounting); Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 
357, 361 (D. Minn. 1927) and 23 F.2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924) (the "continued and frequent abstrac-
tion of large sums of money from the treasury of the corporation by [corporate executives} for use 
in their private ventures" forms basis for an order of accounting and appointment of a special 
receiver). But see Tovrea Land and Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 100 Ariz. 107, 134-35,412 P.2d 47, 
66 (1966) (defendant purchased another shareholder's shares, financing the purchase by making a 
4% secured loan with the corporation; court finds no evidence that this loan was "unfair" and 
declines to find a breach of fiduciary duty). See also R. S. Corson Co. v. Hartman, 144 W.Va. 790, 
Ill S.E.2d 346 ( 1959) (loan to president, approved by the board, to enable him to purchase shares 
owned by the same board members, held not fraudulent as to creditors); Paddock v. Siemoneit, 
147 Tex. 571, 576, 218 S.W.2d 428,431 (1949) (president's numerous withdrawals and loans from 
corporate funds were made during a time when the corporation was solvent. "There was no at-
tempt to conceal [them] from any creditor .... His indebtedness to the corporation was disclosed 
on statements furnished to the principal creditors and they made no objection." The loans were 
made with shareholder consent. Therefore the loans did not reflect any breach of fiduciary duty); 
Davies v. Meisenheimer, 254 Wis. 419, 37 N.W.2d 93 (1949) (new shareholder cannot challenge 
earlier corporate loans made to the president/treasurer with the contemporaneous approval of all 
the shareholders, absent a showing of fraud or evidence that the board in its refusal to call the 
loans has not exercised business judgment); Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 190, 196, 199, 189 A. 
320, 323, 325, 326 (1937) (president/director of corporation engaged in a series of "wholly repre-
hensible" transactions, including "the withdrawal by him, on a large scale, of funds of the [com-
pany] and their use in the purchase of stock of other shareholders upon which he subsequently 
made enormous profits." These loans, defendant alleged, represented a "general practice" of cor-
porate loans to other officers and directors. Substantial recovery was thwarted by the running of 
the statute of limitations). 
29. Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. 
LAW. 35, 68-69 (1966); Rich, supra note 21, at 658; Folk, Corporation Statutes 1959-1966, 1966 
DUKE L.J. 875, 876 n, I. 
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A. The Development of Modern Enabling Statutes 
Even as the number of states adopting prohibitory statutes grew, a 
countertrend developed, mirroring in great respect the movement · 
toward judicial approval of executive self-dealing transactions other 
than loans. 30 Michigan apparently was the first state to enact, in 1931, a 
statute specifically permitting loans to directors, officers and sharehold-
ers, but it was a cautious one, requiring the affirmative vote of two-
thirds of a disinterested board for approval, and subsequent full disclo-
sure to shareholders. 31 Other states followed, with more or less restric-
tive variations on this theme. 32 
In 1967, Delaware adopted by far the most liberal enabling statute, 
permitting corporate loans to be made to officers and employees (in-
cluding those who were also directors) with or without interest and se-
cured or unsecured as the directors (not only "disinterested" directors) 
saw fit. 33 This statute merely required a finding by the board that "such 
loan, guaranty or assistance may reasonably be expected to benefit the 
corporation .... " 34 
Other states quickly followed, and in 1969 the American Bar Asso-
ciation Committee on Corporate Laws, "after lengthy review of the 
30. Marsh, supra note 29, at 57; Phillips, supra note 19, at 187-92. 
31. 
No officer or director of a corporation, other than a corporation an integral part of 
whose business permits it to make loans, shall either directly or indirectly authorize, 
consent to, make or allow any loan or advance to or overdraft or withdrawal by an 
officer, director or shareholder of such corporation out of its funds otherwise than in the 
ordinary and usual course of the business of the corporation and on the ordinary and 
usual terms of payments and security unless each such loan, advance, overdraft or with-
drawal is approved by the vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the board of 
directors of the corporation excluding any director obtaining such loan or advance or 
making such withdrawal or overdraft. A full and detailed statement of all such loans, 
advances, overdrafts and withdrawals and repayments thereof shall be submitted at the 
next annual meeting of shareholders and the aggregate amount of such loans, advance, 
overdrafts and withdrawals and repayments thereof shall be stated on the next annual 
report to shareholders. 
1931 Mich. Pub. Acts 327, quoted in In re Wood's Estate, 299 Mich. 635,644, I N.W.2d 19,23 
(1941). 
32. Cf TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 48-1-814 (1984) (loans to directors or officers require con-
sent of the shareholders) and 48-1-815(2) (1984) (directors approving loans notwithstanding the 
foregoing remain personally liable on the unpaid balance); CAL. Clv. CODE§ 366 (requiring con-
sent to any loan to directors, officers or shareholders by the holders of two-thirds of all classes of 
shares other than the shares held by the benefited borrower), quoted in Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal. 
2d 818, 885, 151 P.2d 840, 843 (Cal. 1944): 
33. W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS§ 2.12 (2d ed. 1973). 
34. See supra note 7. There is no question that this enabling provision was regarded as a 
"fmancial plum" for managers. Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law 
of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861,873 (1969). Professor Folk, who served as Reporter for the 1967 
revision, later commented that, even though he regarded himself as "pro-management," he 
thought the loan enabling provision was "overly liberal." /d. at 865, 874 n.l02. 
HeinOnline -- 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 245 1988
1988:237 Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers 245 
subject," 35 revised the Model Business Corporation Act to delete its 
longstanding prohibition against executive loans. 36 
There is little useful legislative history to these enabling provisions, 
although there is some indication that Delaware's statute and some 
modeled after it were initially adopted merely to accommodate the tem-
porary needs of "salaried qfficers and officer-directors who [were] being 
moved about the country with greater frequency and often upon short 
notice by management. ... " 37 As will be seen presently,38 the purposes 
for which executive loans are now being granted greatly exceed those 
initial, modest prospects. 39 · 
35. Scott, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 24 Bus. LAW. 291,292 (1968). 
36. The 1969 MBCA formulation read: 
A corporation shall not lend money to or use its credit to assist its directors with-
out authorization in the particular case by its shareholders, but may lend money to and 
use its credit to assist any employee of the corporation or of a subsidiary, including any 
such employee who is a director of the corporation, if the board of directors decides that 
such loan or assistance may benefit the corporation. · 
MoDEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT§ 47 (1969). This provision was later amended both in substan·ce and 
in form to provide: · 
[A] corporation may not lend money to or guarantee the obligation of a director of the 
corporation unless: 
(I) the particular loan or guarantee is approved by a majority of the votes 
represented by the outstanding voting shares of all classes, voting as a single voting 
group, except the votes of shares owned by or voted under the control of the bene-
fited director; or 
(2) the eorporation 's board of directors determines that the loan or guarantee 
benefits the corporation and either approves the specific loan or guarantee or a gen-
eral plan authorizing loans and guarantees. 
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 8.32 (1984). 
37. Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 236 Kan. 335, 341, 690 P.2d 1343, 1349 (1984) 
(quoting from the legislative commentary on adoption in 1972 of K.S.A. 17-6303). 
38. See infra Appendix II. 
39. The acceptable purposes for which loans could be made, as delineated by state draft-
ing committees or publishing house commentators, expanded rapidly. By the time the ABA Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws incorporated an executive loan enabling provision into the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act in 1969-just two years after the Delaware enactment-the reporter 
commented that executive loans now appropriately could be made for broader purposes than 
merely facilitating executive relocations: 
[T]he Committee has reversed its earlier position. Contemporary business requirements 
of moving officers from one place to another, the development of stock purchase plans, 
and other ways of creating financial needs [sic], justify the making of loans to officers in 
many cases. 
Scott, supra note 35, at 292. 
This apparent drift toward greater discretion continued. When California revised its 
enabling provision in 1975, its legislative committee indicated a willingness to accept loans made 
generally for "the purpose of assisting the corporation in attracting and retaining the services of 
qualified persons." CAL. CORP. CoDE§ 315, comment b (West 1977). An anonymous commentator 
extended even further this broad view of what constituted appropriate circumstances for making 
an executive loan when Minnesota enacted its enabling provision in 1981: 
[T]he power of the corporation to loan money to those persons or businesses con-
nected with the corporation is a useful tool for the protection of the economic interest of 
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Concurrent with the development of state enabling laws were de-
velopments in federal tax law which encouraged corporate loans to di-
rectors and officers. There developed, for example, a substantial incen-
tive for executives to accept low-interest or interest-free loans in lieu of 
taxable compensation.40 Only recently have changes in the tax laws 
acted to create disincentives to the use of below-market corporate loans 
for this purpose.41 , 
In addition, the widespread use by corporations of stock options 
as an executive perquisite42 soon led to the mechanism of granting a 
corporate loan to enable executives in possession of options to exercise 
them. 43 Even though these loans are costly to the corporation due to 
the need to comply with regulations imposed under both tax and fed-
eral banking laws,44 the practice of making loans to accommodate the 
exercise of stock options has become nearly as routine as the practice of 
granting the options. 
that corporation and a useful incentive with which to attract top management or assure 
future growth. 
(T]he loan or guaranty can be a valuable factor in the retention of experienced 
management or the hiring of promising personnel. The board may make these loans for 
any purpose, as long as it reasonably expects the corporation to directly or indirectly 
benefit from the transaction through better performance by current employees or better 
personnel. 
Reporter's Notes to MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 302A.501 (West 1985). 
40. A. SPORN & V. ROTHSCHILD, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION-PLANNING, PRACTICE, DE-
VELOPMENTS 237 (PLI 1984). See generally Closius& Chapman, Below Market Loans: From Abuse 
to Misuse-A Sports Illustration, 37 CASE W.REs. L. REv. 484, 485, 488-89 (1987). 
41. See I.R.C. § 7872 (1984) (Tax Reform Act of 1984) (treating below market loans as 
interest-bearing, and (I) taxing such loans, including the value of the forgone interest, to corporate 
employees as income, and (2) permitting the employees to take deductions for interest as if it had 
been paid); see also Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986) (amending I.R.C. § 163(d) 
to eliminate the deduction for personal interest payments); Comment, The Taxation of Interest-
Free Loans, 61 TuL. L. REv. 849, 851, 884-88 (1987); Closius & Chapman, supra note 40, at 496-
506; Willbanks, Interest Free Loans Are No Longer Free: Tax Consequences of Business Loans, 47 
MoNT. L. REv. 335, 340-45 (1986); Chvisuk, Taxation of Loans Having Below-Market Interest 
Rates, 21 IDAHO L. REv. 257, 269-70 (1985). Note that loans secured by a mortgage on a relocated 
employee's new residence, granted in connection with the employee's transfer to a new principal 
place of work, are not covered by section 7872. Relocation Loan Notes Subject to New Rules on 
Below-Market Interest Loans, 63 J. TAx'N 240 (1985); Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.7872-5, 50 Fed. Reg. at 
33,561-2 (1985) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 7872). 
42. A. SPORN & V. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 40, at I 08; R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIG-
MAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 115 (1976) ("Nearly every large industrial corporation 
offers its top executives stock options."). 
43. A. SPORN & V, ROTHSCHILD, supra note 40, at 123. 
44. I d. at 124-25. Regulation G of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, 12 C.F.R. § 207.1-.7 (1984), provides that non-bank lenders who extend or maintain ~redit 
secured directly or indirectly by margin stock must register and file contemporaneous lending 
reports with the Federal Reserve, 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(a), maintain specific Fed-required records 
regarding margin loans, 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(e), and file annual reports with their local Federal Re-
serve bank, 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(o), (p). 
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B. Executive Loans and the Agency Problem 
The states' encouragement of executive loans has expanded the 
available opportunities for managerial abuse.45 Of course even where 
prohibitory statutes previously were in effect, managers for years mis-
appropriated corporate funds and, when caught, retrospectively char-
acterized them as "loans."46 But the enactment of the loan enabling 
provisions meant that this conduct no longer had to be clandestine. 
Accordingly, the extra-compensatory transfer of corporate funds to ex-
ecutives has flourished, sometimes with adverse results for shareholders 
and others.47 
There are often grave results for the managers as well. Corporate 
funds have been transferred to managers and later challenged by the 
Internal Revenue Service on the ground that they were not bona fide 
loans at all, but represented a subterfuge to permit the "borrower" to 
avoid paying taxes on income received in the form of compensation or 
dividends.48 Other transactions, while recognized as bona fide "loans," 
45. Other mechanisms regularly used to facilitate the "agency problem" include trans-
fers of property to and from the corporation, side agreements regarding compensation (such as 
"consulting" agreements with outside directors), nepotic transfers (through employment or other 
financial support of managers' family members) and other contractual transfers. See Barnard, 
Curbing Management Conflicts of Interest-The Search for an Effective Deterrent, 40 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 369 (1988). 
46. Some of the most poignant examples of this conduct occurred during the great crash 
of 1929 when corporate officials with signature authority wrote corporate checks to cover their 
personal margin calls, believing or hoping that they would be able to repay the corporate funds. 
These circumstances led to charges of "widespread speculation by corporate officers of funds com-
mitted to their keeping," and numerous cases involving competing claims for proceeds of the 
checks. See Note, Bills and Notes-Corporations-Diversion of Corporate Funds to Private Pur-
poses, 8 N.Y.U.L.Q. 481,481 (1931). 
47. See, e.g., Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954 (W.O. Ark. 1986) (general manager 
of incorporated agricultural co-operative secured board approval for low-interest, unsecured 
loans to his speculative personal business venture amounting to $3.8 million; the board members 
also granted themselves no-interest loans. Ultimately the co-op filed for reorganization under the 
Bankruptcy Act, the general manager was convicted of tax fraud, and the co-op members resorted 
to suit under the federal securities laws). 
48. See, e.g., Busch v. Commissioner, 728 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1984) (sole shareholder of 
corporation withdrew $300,000 and tendered non-interest-bearing uncollateralized notes; court 
found no contemporaneous intent to repay, and treated the advances as constructive dividends); 
Dolese v. United States, 605 F.2d 1146 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980) (court 
treated periodic withdrawals by sole shareholder cumulating to $1,817,133 as constructive divi-
dends); Oyster Shell Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1963) (shareholders of 
closely held corporation found to have received constructive dividends notwithstanding corporate 
records reflecting their indebtedness); Lewis v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1414 (1985); 
Rapoport v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 205 (1983); Piekos v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1401 (1982); Pizzarelli v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 156 (1980); Smith v. Commis-
sioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 900 (1980); McLemore v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 259 (1973) 
Holman v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1323 (1973); Electric & Neon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
56 T.C. 1324 (1971), a./f'd mem., 496 F. 2d 876 (5th Cir. 1974); Chesapeake Mfg. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1285, 1292-93 (1964). Of course, conclusions reached in IRS audits re-
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have successfully been challenged for failure to satisfy the "benefit limi-
tations" of the state enabling statutes.49 The extension of executive 
loans has played a prominent role in a number of corporate insolven-
cies 50 and even a few criminal proceedings. 51 
Closely held corporations today regularly make executive and in-
sider loans, 52 often without regard to corporate formalities. 53 Publicly 
garding the taxation of various corporate expenditures are not conclusive in a derivative action 
challenging-the expenditures. See Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 f.2d 3, II (1st Cir. 1986). 
49. See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text. 
50. E.g., American Nat'! Bank of Austin v. Mortgageamerica Corp. (In re Mort-
gageamerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266, 1268 (5th Cir. 1983) (creditor sued controlling shareholder of 
a corporation in chapter 7 proceeding, asserting a right to recover from him personally under the 
"trust fund doctrine." Among. the plaintiff's allegations were that the defendant had caused the 
company to make various loans to defendant and entities controlled by him, totalling $2,300,000); 
Levy v. Runnells (In re Landbank Equity Corp.), 66 Bankr. 949, 962 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) 
(trustee's suit against controlling shareholders of a second mortgage company alleged loans to 
them and relatives totalling $1.6 million, plus forgone points totalling $629,344; court found that 
the defendants "took, moved property around, favored themselves, and bled the company to 
death for their own selves' sake. If exemplary damages are not here clearly proper, there has never 
existed a case where they were."); McLemore v. Olson (In reB & L Laboratories, Inc.), 62 Bankr. 
494,510, (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (suit by trustee in bankruptcy to pierce the corporate veil and 
recover losses from director/shareholders was successful, the court noting that defendants had 
"plundered the assets of [the corporation]," leaving it with liabilities in excess of $2,000,000, by a 
variety of means, including making loans to directors and officers without formal shareholder 
approval); Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 301 N.C. 561,573,273 S.E.2d 247,254 (N.C. 1981) (non-
management shareholders entitled to receivership where, among other acts of misappropriation, 
the chief executive officer borrowed "large sums of money from several of the corporations, and 
these transactions were never approved by the shareholders or the directors, as required by [appli-
cable North Carolina law]."). 
51. See United States v. Curtis, 782 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1986) (sole proprietor charged 
with tax evasion defended his nonpayment on the ground that receipt of checks payable to his 
business but deposited into his personal account represented interest-free loans, rather than tax-
able income). 
52. E.g., Bricklin v. Stengol Corp., I Conn. App. 656, 660, 476 A.2d 584, 587 (1984) 
(corporation's $10,000 loan to start-up business owned by directors' wives found to be "unfair" to 
the corporation and voided). See also Jacobs, Taking It To the Street, Wall St. J., Special Report 
on Small Business, May 19, 1986, at 31 D (Crazy Eddie, Inc., during its pre-public existence, "had 
made interest-free loans totalling $470,000 to some of the [members of the chairman's family]. It 
had paid two of their wives $75,000 each. And the New York-area company was owed more than 
$3 million by other [family] enterprises, including a son-in-law's audio and videocasette business 
with the concession to sell tapes in Crazy Eddie Stores. A shoe store chain, which had filed a 
petition under federal bankruptcy law, controlled by another relative had $500,000 of its debts 
guaranteed by Crazy Eddie."). 
53. See, e.g., Levin v. Levin, 43 Md. App. 380, 389,405 A.2d 770,777 (1979) (president 
of a close corporation was shown to have "borrowed almost $100,000.00 from [the company), 
drawing checks upon the corporate funds either to himself or in payment of personal obligations. 
He stated that the borrowings were without knowledge or approval of the directors of the corpora-
tion [his wife and daughter] and without any form of corporate resolution or authority."); Speer v. 
Dighton Grain, Inc., 229 Kan. 272, 274, 276, 624 P.2d 952, 954, 955 (1981) (manager/director of 
close corporation had "written some $87,000 in corporate checks to himself and had restored only 
a portion of that amount to the corporate account." Only after the auditors protested, did he 
tender a $54,000 unsecured note for the remaining balance.); Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 224 
Kan. 506, 518, 582 P.2d 1136, 1145-46 (i978) (officers of close corporation were found to have 
used corporate funds for payment of insurance premiums on themselves and members of their 
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held companies with serious financial problems frequently have sub-
stantial amounts outstanding in executive loans. 54 One might argue 
from these examples that the executive loan enabling statutes have rep-
resented a wrongheaded development in corporate law and ought to be 
repealed. Surely such a gesture would simplify the task of monitoring 
management. 
But the development of the state enabling acts has not inexorably 
led to managerial overreaching; it has merely facilitated it. Undoubt-
edly the vast majority of executive loans authorized pursuant to statute 
have been duly repaid and, apart from what they may have represented 
in the way of opportunity costs, caused no harm to shareholders or 
creditors. Indeed, those loans which were repaid at a competitive rate of 
interest may have represented an optimum corporate investment. 
Moreover, much of the managerial misappropriation uncovered in 
these cases may well have appeared in some other guise had the loan 
enabling provisions not been in existence. 
Still, the existence of the loan enabling statutes has provided a 
tempting mechanism for executives bent on self-enrichment at the ex-
pense of minority shareholders or creditors or both. 55 This is particu-
larly true of those corporations which are not subject to oversight by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In these corporations 
executive loans, whether abusive or not, are not required to be disclosed 
families, excessive travel expenses and other personal expenses, totalling $90,000. "During the 
course of the trial, the defendants admitted some 100 payments had been made by error from the 
corporation or partnership but contended they were honest mistakes and defendants were willing 
to account for them."). 
54. For example, during ftscal year 1985, in which Allegheny International, Inc. lost a 
record $109 million, it made $32.3 million in loans to its officers and directors, repayable at a 2% 
rate of interest. Of this amount, $21.9 million was loaned for purposes of stock acquisition, while 
$10.4 million was loaned "for other things." Symonds, Big Trouble at Allegheny, BusiNESS WEEK, 
Aug. II, 1986, at 60. LTV, Inc., during a year in which it lost $378.2 million and was forced to 
close its Pennsylvania manufacturing operations, made an interest-free loan of $965,250 to its 
chairman/CEO to enable him to exercise his stock options. "[He] apparently had not been able to 
save enough on his annual salary of$743,315." Olasky, The Public Relations Scams of 1985, 1986 
Bus. & Soc'v REv. 52. Horn & Hardart Co., which in 1986 lost $28.4 million, and whose share 
value has dropped by more than half since 1983, in 1984 made (and recently extended) a $100,000 
"personal loan" to its executive vice president and a $154,700 loan to its vice-chairman to permit 
his investment in a casino. Leonard, Why Didn't They Pay Him to Stay Home?. FoRBES, June 15, 
1987, at 120-21; Horn & Hardart Co., Proxy Statement, at 12 (May 14, 1987). See also Maher v. 
Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436, 440, 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1983) (publicly held corporation suffering 
declining earnings is beset by derivative suits alleging mismanagement and violation of the federal 
securities laws, including assertions that interest-free loans to six senior corporate officers to per-
mit exercise of stock options and to cover tax liabilities in connection therewith, constituted 
waste). 
55. Unlike other conflict of interest mechanisms, executive loans do not require an ex-
change of goods or services whose value is subject to comparative valuation or independent 
appraisal. 
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to shareholders 56 and thus go undetected unless insolvency results and 
a receiver steps in. 57 
Even some enterprises governed by the disclosure requirements of 
the federal securities laws, however, make lending decisions which, at 
least from a prudent lending perspective, can only be considered highly 
questionable, particularly in the context of overall corporate perform-
ance. What follows is an examination of the current lending practices of 
some of these companies. 
III. HOW THE STATUTES HAVE BEEN APPLIED-AN EMPIRICAL VIEW 
OF CORPORATE LOANS TODIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 
The author recently reviewed the executive lending practices of 152 
publicly traded corporations, randomly selected from the proxy state-
ment inventory of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (the Dean Witter sam-
ple). Beginning with the proxy statements which these companies had 
circulated to shareholders during the 1987 proxy season, fifty-five com-
panies (or 36.2%) disclosed that, during the fiscal year preceding the 
solicitation, they had made or retained on their books at least one loan 
in excess of $60,000 to one or more of their officers or directors. Seven 
of these corporations were banks or financial institutions which make 
loans in the ordinary course of their business, and are carefully regu-
lated in the manner in which they are permitted to do so. 58 These banks 
or financial institutions had made loans to certain of their executives 
during the preceding year, which were excluded from the study. 59 With 
56. The SEC requires disclosure to shareholders of material executive loans (by defini-
tion those in excess of $60.000) both in the 10-K Annual Report ( 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 ( 1987)) and 
in the Annual Proxy Solicitation Schedule 14A (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-IOI (1987)), both of which 
incorporate by reference Item 404(c) of Regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. § 229.404(c) (1987)). Among 
corporations not subject to SEC oversight, only California domiciliary corporations are required 
to disclose loans to their officers or directors, and even then exclusions are provided for loans of 
less than $40,000 (CAL. CORP. CoDE§ 150l(b)(l) (West 1988)) and for companies with less than 
100 shareholders whose by-laws waive the annual report requirement (CAL CoRP. CoDE§ 150l(a) 
(West 1988)}. See generally Barnard, supra note 45, at 402-05; Brudney, supra note I 0, at 1437. 
57. See Sullivan & Young, Symposium: The Proposed Michigan Business Corporation 
Act: Officers and Directors. 18 WAYNE L. REv. 951, 969 (1972). The fact that managers have this 
broad discretion to divert corporate assets to their own use is essentially unknown to investors. 
Brudney, supra note 10, at 1416-17 ("investors believe (or assume) that management's discretion 
to serve itself at their expense is considerably more limited than it actually is under prevailing legal 
norms and existing ·contracts.' ... [Sltockholders expect management to work diligently and skill-
fully to maximize their wealth-rather than to work merely at a pace that enhances such wealth 
moderately or does not diminish it-and not to divert more corporate assets to management than 
the compensation expressly provided for it."). 
58. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text. 
59. Each reported that the loans were made "on substantially the same terms, including 
interest rates and collateral, as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with other 
persons, and ... in the opinion of management do not involve more than normal risk of col-
lectability or present other unfavorable features." Alaska National Bank of the North, Proxy 
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respect to the remaining forty-eight corporations, the proxy statements 
revealed the following lending practices: 
No. of Companies 
Intended Use of Proceeds Reporting 
to purchase a home/relocation 13 
to purchase shares in the lending corporation 8 
to exercise a stock option granted by the lending 7 
corporation 
to purchase shares other than in the lending 4 
corporation or otherwise invest in a business 
venture 
as purchase money mortgage against property 6 
purchased from the lending corporation 
for "personal reasons" (undisclosed) 6 
other (e.g., advances toward purchases of life 8 
insurance; to fund operating deficits of a 
business venture; "in connection with the 
payment of certain income tax withholding 
obligations;" to defray certain personal 
expenses until other funds become available 
to the estate of a deceased officer) 
purpose of loan not disclosed 15 
Several aspects of this sample warrant comment. First is the 
number of companies that reported having made executive loans dur-
ing 1986. More than one-third of the companies circulating proxy solic-
itations in this sample reported having made or retained one or more 
substantial loans to their executives during the preceding year. The 
sample is representative, of course, not of corporations as a whole, or 
even of the entire body of corporations which are subject to SEC proxy 
regulations, 60 but rather of those corporations sufficiently publicly held 
to circulate large numbers of proxy solicitations via the brokerage 
Statement, at 9 (May 6, 1987); Heritage Financial Services, Inc., Proxy Statement, at II (May 6, 
1987); John Adams Life Corp., Proxy Statement, at 6 (Apr. 30, 1987); Security Pacific Corp., 
Proxy Statement, at 46 (Apr. 28, 1987); Trustcompany Bancorporation, Proxy Statement, at 7 
(May 6. 1987); Ambassador Financial Group, Inc., Proxy Statement, at 7 (May 15, 1987) (loans 
made at favorable interest rates); Ameriana Savings Bank, F.S.B., Proxy Statement, at 5 (Apr. 30, 
1987) (loan origination fees waived). For those entities to which federal banking law applies, these 
disclaimers reflect the requirements of 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(a) (I) (1987), which strictly limits the 
terms upon which loans can be made to a bank's executive officers, directors or principal 
shareholders. 
60. There are 12,450 such companies now registered with the SEC. DIRECTORY OF CoM-
PANIES REQUIRED TO FILE ANNUAL REPORTS WITH THE SEC UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 
OF 1934 (Sept. 30, 1986). 
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houses. The lending experiences of corporations as a whole may well be 
different. 
A recent study by the author of forty-four companies engaging in 
an initial public offering found that the percentage of such corporations 
which had lent funds in material amounts to their executives in the three 
years preceding going public was 43.2%. 61 It is likely that close corpo-
rations or others not anticipating a public offering even more frequently 
make cash advances to their executives. 62 But even limiting the extra-
polation to widely traded companies, the Dean Witter sample would 
suggest that thousands of such companies each year grant substantial 
loans to their executives for a variety of uses. 63 
A second observation relates to the amounts involved in these 
transactions. The executive loans disclosed in the Dean Witter sample 
ranged from inconsequential to breathtaking in amount: ranging up-
ward to two $2.5 million "personal loans" for otherwise undescribed 
purposes, 64 but more commonly including non-cash extensions of 
credit in the mid-six-figure range for the exercise of stock options and 
cash loans in the low-six-figure range for relocation expenses. 65 The 
amount of cash and credit tied up in executive loans by this group of 
forty-eight non-bank companies totalled more than $60 million. 66 
The amounts involved per corporation were in most cases proba-
bly not sufficient to have a material impact on share value67 but, under 
the SEC proxy solicitation guidelines, they were sufficient to require 
disclosure to shareholders called upon to vote for the reelection of di-
rectors. 68 Moreover, the dollar amounts of some of the loans were suffi-
ciently large, assuming noncompliance with the statutes requiring cor-
61. Barnard, supra note 45, at 377. These loans were made for a variety of purposes, 
including share purchases, home relocation, business development (of both related and unrelated 
entities), "personal" and "undisclosed." It is notable that a number of these corporations assured 
investors that, effective with the success of the public offering, corporate loans to executives would 
cease, or be subjected to new safeguards. See, e.g., Native Plants, Inc., S-1 No. 33-6467, at 31 (filed 
June 13, 1986) ("The company intends that any future loans made by the company to officers, 
directors, key employees and their affiliates will be made only for reasonable business purposes 
and with the approval of a majority of the company's independent, disinterested directors."). 
62. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
63. Fifty-five corporations out of the sample of 152 represents 36.2% of the reporting 
corporations. Applying that percentage to the 12,450 companies now registered with the SEC 
would mean that more than 4,500 such companies made executive loans in excess of$60,000 dur-
ing the most recent fiscal year. 
64. Carolco Pictures, Inc., Proxy Statement, at 6 (May 22, 1987). 
65. See infra Appendix II. 
66. /d. 
67. See Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U. 
MIAMI L. REv., 187,204 (1983); Eisenberg, Shortcomings of the Arguments Against Modernizing 
Corporate Law, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 626, 627 (1984). 
68. As noted supra note 56, the materiality standard under existing federal law is 
$60,000. It is, perhaps, appropriate to emphasize that, while federal securities law requires disclo-
sure of executive loans, it does not require shareholder approval thereof. Federal banking law 
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porate benefit, to generate an incentive for a shareholder derivative 
challenge even in the absence of other incidents of managerial abuse. 
Third, one may remark upon the interest rates charged by lending 
corporations to their executive borrowers. During a period when the 
prime rate averaged 8.33%,69 corporations were extending credit to 
their executives at rates ranging from 0% 70 to a 13% stated rate. 71 
There is no discussion in the sampled proxy materials of the basis for 
choosing an interest rate or otherwise "pricing" the loan, so it is impos-
sible to ascertain, for example, whether a particular interest rate was 
charged to reflect increased lending risk or loan processing costs, 
whether it was the result of bargaining, or whether it simply represented 
an arbitrary selection. There is no indication, as one would surely find 
in the case of conventional lenders, of mechanisms designed to protect 
these corporations from movements in interest rates over the credit cy-
cle, such as floating interest rates, graduated rates and prepayment 
penalties. 72 
Some case law suggests that executive loans made at below-market 
interest rates, if challenged, must result, at the least, in an upward inter-
est rate adjustment. 73 To that extent, many of the loans reported in the 
Dean Witter sample would warrant challenge. But here, unlike in the 
discussion of loan principal, the amounts involved generally would not 
be sufficie11t to generate shareholder invocation of liability rules. 
Fourth, nearly a third of the reporting companies failed to disclose 
the purpose for which the proceeds of their executive loans were in-
tended, which one would suppose constitutes a violation of federal dis-
effectively requires shareholder approval of benefit plans pursuant to which loans are made to 
facilitate share purchases. 12 C.F.R. § 207.5(2) (1987). 
69. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 5-14 (vol. 67, no. 5, May 
1987). 
70. See Appendix 11. It is likely following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that executive 
loans will not continue to be made at grossly below-market interest rates. See supra note 41 and 
accompanying .text. 
71. DiGiorgio Corp., Proxy Statement, at 6 (Apr. 27, 1987). 
72. See Merris, Business Loans at Large Commercial Banks: Policies and Practice. re-
printed in BANK MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS AND ISSUES 49-60 (J. Bricked. 1979). 
73. Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1118, 1133-34, 435 
N.E.2d 712, 722-23 (5th Dist. 1982); see also Maxwell v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 814, 
821, 339 N.Y.S.2d 347,356 ( 1972) (subsidiary corporation which loaned funds to its 97.2% share-
holder was entitled to "at least what [the borrower] would have had to pay an outsider to borrow 
the money." This was held to include not only the applicable prime rate but also the value of 
compensating balances which would have been required by a bank lender, and which would have 
increased the effective rate of interest.); Washington Nat'l Trust Co. v. W.M. Dary Co., 116 Ariz. 
171, 174, 568 P.2d 1069, 1072 (1977) ($140,000 loan to corporation's president, repayable at 4%, is 
inherently unfair to the corporation given what would have been available to it in the money 
market); Hill v. Hill, 279 Pa. Super. I 54, 159,420 A.2d 1078, 1080-81 (1980) (corporate loans to 
businesses wholly owned by the lending corporation's president at rates "substantially below the 
rate charged unrelated businesses" constitute grounds for an accounting in favor of minority 
shareholders). 
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closure laws. 74 In any event, nondisclosure makes it impossible for 
shareholders of those corporations to ascertain whether in fact the 
loans made could reasonably be said to have provided an enterprise 
benefit or to reflect the exercise of sound business judgment. Federal 
disclosure law does not require a corporation to articulate the asserted 
benefit arising out of an executive loan 7 s and thus does not support the 
decisionmaking standards of those states which impose a benefit limita-
tion on such loans. 
Fifth, the Dean Witter sample revealed substantial uniformity in 
the way in which (and purposes for which) corporations make loans, 
regardless of their state of incorporation and the applicable enabling 
act. 76 Conservatively, three of the forty-eight lending companies in this 
sample broke the law of their incorporating states when making loans 
without express and prior shareholder approval. 77 
Although a given loan's characterization is not readily ascertaina-
ble merely from reading the proxy statement in which it is described, it 
is fair to assume that there are two types of executive loans which are 
reflected in these materials-those which are sufficiently rewarding in 
their risk/return ratio that any conventional lender would make them 
and those that are not. 
For example, loans made to facilitate the exercise of stock options 
are, by definition, desirable credits which conventional lenders would 
74. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(c) (1987) which requires disclosure, inter 
alia, of the borrower's name, "the nature of the person's relationship by reason of which such 
person's indebtedness is required to be described, the largest aggregate amount of indebtedness 
outstanding at any time during [the period since the beginning of the registrant's last] fiscal year, 
the nature of the indebtedness and of the transaction in which it was incurred, the amount thereof 
outstanding as of the latest practicable date and the rate of interest paid or charged .... "(emphasis 
added.) If this provision can reasonably be interpreted to exclude a description of the purpose for 
which the proceeds are to be used, then the Regulation is flawed and its purpose-"to enable 
shareholders to guard against officers and directors using their authority to obtain treatment 
favorable to themselves but detrimental to the corporation"-has not been wholly satisfied. SEC 
No-Action Letter (Sept. 21, 1984). 
75. Certainly practitioners understand that the basis for any directoral finding of corpo-
rate benefit is not a discloseable item. See Mann, Moral and Ethical Problems; Loans to Manage-
ment and Compensation Problems, 31 Bus. LAW. 1305, 1306 (1976) ("There is a requirement, of 
course, that you disclose loans to management in excess of$10,000; but I don't read that as saying 
you disclose the rationale of the board in deciding to make the loan. There is no requirement of 
such qualitative information, and in reports filed under the Exchange Act, I've not gone on behind 
the requirements of the form to make the disclosure of the reason why the board has made the 
loan, and other details that the ethical investor might be concerned about."). 
76. See infra Appendix II. 
77. Beehive International (loan to Executive Vice-President/Director, requires share-
holder approval under Utah law); Gerber Energy International, Inc. (loans to officer/director, 
require shareholder approval underColorado law); Tel Electronics, Inc. (loan to President/CEO, 
requires shareholder approval under Utah law). The California corporations may also have vio-
lated the law by not securing shareholder approval of benefit plans or authorizing by-laws. 
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welcome. 78 They are (or can be) collateralized by security of ap-
praisable value. If the spread between the exercise price and the market 
price is sufficient, any lending institution, subject to its own lending re-
strictions, 79 would make the loan at competitive rates. A corporation 
desiring to accommodate one of its executives unable to raise the cash 
exercise price80 could use its existing banking relationships to facilitate 
a loan by a conventional lender. It might guarantee the loan81 or main-
tain some compensating balance in order to reduce transaction costs to 
the borrower. But these loans are not made for lack of an alternative 
lending market. The same situation exists where corporations make 
home mortgage loans secured by the borrower's residence. 
Other loans, however,. are the sort that. would not be m~de by con-
ventional lenders, or certainly not at the interest rate charged or on the 
terms offered by the corporate lender, precisely because they represent 
poor credit risks. "Personal loans" to an overextended borrower, un-
secured loans made to a specuiative business venture, workout loans 
made to failing ventures without protective covenants and the like 
would generally fall into this latter category. 
In short, in an efficiently operating economic environment, busi-
ness corporations are either making loans which they do not need to 
make (because alternative sources of credit are available to the bor-
rower), or they are making loans which (at least from a purely credit-
based perspective) they ought not to make. Neither of these observa-
tions, however, directly addresses the statutory standard upon which 
such loans should be judged: the requirement of some corporate "bene-
fit." Some loans in either of the above categories presumably could sat-
isfy that statutory standard, assuming its meaning were of sufficient 
scope. But the meaning of "corporate benefit" in the context of execu-
78. Regulation G of the Federal Reserve Board,l2 C.F.R. § 2il7 (1988), provides that 
corporations making loans to finance acquisition of .margin stock pursuant to a stock option, 
purchase or ownership plan approved by the shareholders are limited to lending the "good faith 
loan value" of the stock, 12 C.F.R. § 207.5(b), which means "the amount which a lender, exercis-
ing sound credit judgment. would lend without regard to the customer's other assets held as colla!· 
eral in connection with unrelated transactions." 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(e) (1987). Loans made outside 
of such plans are limited even further . 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(b) (1987). 
79. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text. 
80. See Halperin, Financing the Acquisition of Stock by Employees, 6 J . CORP. LAW 239, 
240 (1980) (the common requirement that stock options be paid in cash " may impose significant 
financial burdens on the executive who is often relatively 'cash poor,' with the bulk of his net worth 
being in illiquid assets. in such circumstances, the executive must either substantially deplete his 
liquid assets to finance the acquisition of shares or, if he is able, borrow the necessary funds ."). 
81. This approach was used, for example, by one of the companies in the Dean Witter 
sample, Academy Insurance Group, Inc., which reported that, in connection with the execution of 
an employment agreement with the executive vice-president in June 1986, the company "guaran-
teed for four years a loan to Mr. Cwiok from a financial institution in the amount of$500,000 the 
proceeds of which Mr. Cwiok used to pay for [certain convertible notes]." Proxy Statement, at 6 
(May 14, 1987). 
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tive loans remains obscure, especially to the directors who must apply 
that standard. 
A. Giving "Benefit" Meaning 
There are many ways in which the liberal grant of executive loans 
intuitively might constitute a benefit to the corporation: it fosters loy-
alty and good will; it frees up the executive's time which otherwise 
would be spent seeking financing elsewhere and therefore encourages 
enhanced performance;82 it may be necessary to maintain a corpora-
tion's competitive position in the market for manageriallabor.83 Other 
"benefits" might arise in certain lending situations: the investment may 
provide the best available return to the lending corporation; granting a 
purchase money mortgage may accelerate an advantageous transfer of 
property. 
The question is whether these represent the sort of "benefit" envi-
sioned by the legislative drafters when they imposed a "benefit" re-
quirement on executive loans. One must assume, given traditional no-
tions of statutory construction, 84 that by its separate placement and its 
choice of language, the "benefit" requirement for executive loans repre-
sents a concept capable of some precise articulation separate from and 
more demanding than the "fairness" standard applicable to other con-
flict of interest transactions85 and from the "waste" standard applica-
ble to other compensation decisions. 86 As a matter of public policy, 
what constitutes an acceptable basis for approving an executive loan? 
Does the answer change according to the size and/or shareholder 
makeup of the enterprise? Only two cases have directly addressed these 
issues and neither has provided an adequate answer. 
82. A particularly generous example of this "relief from distraction" concept appears in 
the most recent proxy statement of Southmark Corporation, which discloses the establishment of 
a line of credit for $8.5 million and $1.5 million, respectively, for Southmark's Chairman and Vice-
Chairman. "The Board authorized the lines of credit so that Messrs. Phillips and Friedman would 
be able to meet any loan margin calls resulting from recent declines in the market price of the 
Common Stock without having to sell any of the shares of Common Stock that they own. The 
Board believes that any such sales would have the effect of further depressing the market price of 
the Common Stock, and could distract Messrs. Phillips and Friedman from the affairs of 
Southmark. As of December 15, 1987, Southmark had advanced Messrs. Phillips and Friedman 
$4,250,000 and $750,000, respectively, under the lines of credit." Proxy Statement, at 12 (Dec. 30, 
1987). 
83. Cf. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 154, 98 A.2d 581, 586, appeal dis-
missed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953) (finding that corporate expenditures for charitable purposes could be 
justified as "being for the benefit of the corporation; indeed, if need be the matter may be viewed 
strictly in terms of actual survival of the corporation in a free enterprise system."). 
84. See, e.g., R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 229-33 
(1975) (the "plain meaning" presumption). 
85. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. 
86. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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In Oberhelman v. Barnes Investment Corp., 87 a minority share-
holder brought a derivative action seeking to recover funds loaned by 
Barnes Investment Corp., a bank holding company, to its majority 
shareholder, president and chairman. These loans, totalling $89,912, 
were unsecured and interest-free. Following the filing of the lawsuit, 
Barnes shareholders (comprised of plaintiff, defendant and their wives) 
met and ratified the loans over plaintiff's objection, with the defendant 
casting the decisive vote. 
The lower court held for the defendant, indicating that "the loans 
made to Arthur M. Nease, Jr. by The Barnes Investment Corporation 
are not unlawful or void transactions but are specifically authorized by 
K.S.A. 17-6.303."88 The Kansas Supreme Court reversed, noting that 
throughout the period during which Barnes was making loans to its 
president, the company itself had an outstanding note payable, the 
principal rising to $130,000 and interest rates ranging from 6% to 19% 
per annum. 89 Indeed, the court noted, "during some years funds bor-
rowed at interest were being loaned or paid to Nease at no interest."90 
On the question of whether Barnes' loans could "reasonably be 
expected to benefit the corporation," as required by Kansas law, the 
Kansas court concluded, without amplification, that the answer was 
"no." "[H]is purpose was not the welfare of Barnes Investment and its 
other stockholders but his own personal benefit. " 91 
Roxbury State Bank v. The. Clarendon92 arose out of the sale in 
November 1970 of The Clarendon Hotel in Hackettstown, New Jersey. 
The transaction was effected by the sale of stock in the corporation 
which owned the hotel to another corporation (Hook Mountain Indus-
tries) owned by two investors, Codella and Douglas. Hook Mountain 
financed the purchase in part by taking out a $160,000 loan, secured by 
a first mortgage, from the Roxbury State Bank. As Roxbury knew 
when it made the loan, some $34,000 of the proceeds was used to dis-
charge outstanding loans which had been made by Roxbury to other 
corporations owned by Codella and Douglas. 
When the bank sought to foreclose on the mortgage, the New 
Jersey Chancery Court held the mortgage invalid to the extent of this 
$34,000 and otherwise. 93 On appeal, the bank characterized the 
$34,000 as a loan made by Hook Mountain to Codella and Douglas 
87. 236 Kan. 335, 690 P.2d 1343 (1984). 
88. /d. at 338, 690 P.2d at 1346. 
89. Id. at 340, 690 P.2d at 1348. 
90. /d. 
91. /d. 
92. 129 N.J. Super. 358, 324 A.2d 24 (App. Div. 1984). 
93. /d. at 379, 324 A.2d at 27; Roxbury State Bank v. Clarendon, 123 N.J. Super. 400, 
410, 303 A.2d 340, 345 (Ch. Div. 1973). 
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pursuant to N.J.S.A. 14A:6-11 which provided at that time that a cor-
poration could lend money to or guarantee any obligation of, or 
"otherwise assist" any officer or other employee of the corporation 
whenever any such loan, guaranty or assistance "may reasonably be 
expected to benefit the corporation. " 94 
The New Jersey Superior Court rejected this characterization, not-
ing that the bank mortgage was neither a loan to nor a guaranty of any 
obligation of Codella and Douglas.95 The court added: 
While it may have been intended to "assist" them, in a sense, 
we find no basis for a finding that the corporation, as distin-
guished from Codella and Douglas personally, could reason-
ably be expected to benefit from the transaction. 96 
These decisions, reflecting in the Clarendon case simple misappro-
priation and in the Oberhelman case classic oppression of a minority 
shareholder, provide little guidance to the conscientious director seek-
ing to exercise appropriate judgment when presented with a proposed 
executive loan. In either case, disinterested directors performing any 
genuine monitoring function would presumably not have approved the 
challenged loans notwithstanding whatever collegial inclination to do 
so may have existed. 97 
If anything is instructive, it may be that there are only two cases 
even touching on the subject, and neither one attempts to set guidelines 
by which a conscientious director in the future might effectively seek to 
distinguish those loans beneficial to the lending company from those 
merely beneficial to the borrower. 98 Those commentators who, upon 
adoption of the "benefit" standard, anticipated that it was in effect a 
standardless standard, 99 may have been right. 
94. 129 N.J. Super. at 377, 324 A.2d at 34. 
95. /d. 
96. /d. 
97. See Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal 
Implications o,(Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 ( 1985); Brudney, The Independent 
Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 610-13; Lasker v. Burks, 567 
F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Schwartz, A Case for 
Federal Chartering o,( Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125, 1154 (1976). 
98. Executive loan cases based on non-statutory analyses suffer the same shortcoming. 
See Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969) (president/controlling 
shareholder of close corporation who borrowed $110,000 in corporate funds in order to purchase a 
seat on the )'lew York Stock Exchange at a time ( 1958) when Delaware law forbade such loans and 
when Exchange rules prohibited corporate ownership of stock exchange seats, did so "for his own 
ultimate benefit" and must therefore account to the corporation for all brokerage commissions 
received by him while holding the seat, and for his profits ($330,000) in the sale of the seat). 
99. See Sullivan & Young, supra note 57, at 969 ("The prerequisite standard is obviously 
elastic; it is certainly doubtful that any court would challenge the determination by directors that a 
loan to a particular director-officer could reasonably be expected to benefit the corporation."). 
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There are, of course, alternative sources for crafting a meaning for 
the term "corporate benefit." Courts have explored the concept in a 
variety of non-lending contexts. For example, courts have determined 
the existence of a corporate, as distinguished from an individual, benefit 
in deciding whether a particular lawsuit should be brought as a deriva-
tive or direct action; 100 whether a derivative suit, once brought, should 
be dismissed; 101 whether a derivative litigant at the close of the pro-
ceedings should be awarded non-statutory attorneys' fees on the 
ground that he has performed "corporate therapeutics;" 102 to whom, 
as between executives and their employing corporation, litigation de-
fense costs should be allocated; 103 whether an individual has acted as 
the servant or agent of an enterprise and so may subject it to tort104 or 
100. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS§ 7.01 comments and reporter's notes (Tent. Draft No.6, Oct. 
10, 1986) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE No. 61. 
101. E.g .. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 
( 1983) (permitting a special litigation committee to assess whether the "likely recoverable damages 
discounted by the probability of a finding of liability are less than the costs to the corporation in 
continuing the action .... "). See generally ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE No. 6, 
supra note 100, at§ 7.08 comments and reporter's notes. 
102. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,396 (1970) (plaintiffs' demonstration 
that defendant's merger proxy solicitation contained material misstatements created a non-pecuni-
ary corporate benefit upon which an award of attorneys' fees may be premised, because it provided 
an "important means of enforc[ing]" Congress' goal of "fair and informed corporate suffrage"); 
Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362,365, 101 N.W.2d 423,427 (1960) (a 
benefit sufficient to warrant an award of attorneys' fees "must be something more than technical in 
its consequence and be one that accomplishes a result which corrects or prevents an abuse which 
would be prejudicial to the rights and interests of the corporation .... "). 
103. E.g .. Baupre v. Kingen, 109 Idaho 610, 613, 710 P.2d 520, 523 (1985) (upholds 
personal liability of shareholders for defense fees incurred in a collection case in whieh the exis-
tence of their personal guarantees of the debt made the defense of the action "more realistically ... 
for the benefit of" the shareholders than for the benefit of the company); Evans v. Stockton & 
Hing (Matter of Southwest Restaurant Systems, Inc.), 607 F.2d. 1241 (9th Cir. 1979) (corpora-
tion's undertaking to pay legal fees for the defense of a derivative suit against two corporate of-
ficers representing 2/3 of the total share ownership is not binding on the corporation in reorganiza-
tion where legal services "were solely for the individuals and did not benefit the corporation"). See 
also In re Banks, 283 Or. 459, 584 P.2d 284 (1978) (en bane) (demonstrating the difficulties in 
distinguishing between work done for a close corporation and work done for its dominating 
shareholder). 
104. E.g .. Thurston Metal & Supply Co. v. Taylor, 230 Va. 475, 339 S.E.2d 538 (1986) 
(plaintiff injured at a company golf outing by club thrown by corporate president may recover 
against corporation because the weekend, planned for suppliers and customers, was intended to 
benefit the corporation); see also Gerger v. Campbell, 98 Wis. 2d 282, 297 N.W.2d 183 (1980) 
(president of close corporation who altered safety features on corporate equipment which later 
severely injured an employee, is immunized from personal tort liability, because he was acting in 
his supervisory capacity, and not in any personal capacity); Phillips v. Montana Educ. Ass'n, 187 
Mont. 419, 610 P.2d 154 ( 1980) (corporate officers are shielded from liability for tortious interfer-
ence with contract so long as their conduct is not for personal pecuniary gain but rather in the 
furtherance of corporate interests); but see Olympic Fish Prods. Inc. v. Lloyd, 93 Wash. 2d 596, 
602, 611 P.2d 737, 740 (1980) (director/manager of close corporation may not be immunized from 
personal liability in an action for tortious interference with contract, where court could reasonably 
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criminal 105 liability; whether a corporate employee is subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction based upon contacts arising solely out of his employ-
ment activities or whether he is protected by a "fiduciary shield"; 106 
whether a given corporate expenditure is proper or an improper 
"gift";107 whether a corporate expenditure by a regulated utility is 
properly charged to the shareholders or to ratepayers; 108 whether 
shareholder payments on behalf of a corporation should be tax deduct-
ible, 109 and whether executive conduct constitutes usurpation of a cor-
find that his conduct was "solely for his own benefit rather than in the best interests of (his 
company)"). 
For a similar analysis in a contractual setting, see Martin Roofing, Inc., v. Goldstein, 60 
N.Y.2d 262,267,457 N.E.2d 700,702,469 N.Y.S.2d 595,597 (1983) (oral promises of payment 
made by corporation's president to a supplier do not result in his personal liability, because fact 
that supplier then returned to work benefits the corporation rather than the officer who, as a 
minority shareholder, only benefited indirectly). 
105. E.g., United States v. Cattle King Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232, 241 (lOth Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Stanko v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 573 (1986) (meat packing company held crimi-
nally liable for violations of the Federal Meat Inspection Act by its operating manager, because 
those actions economically benefited the corporate defendant); United States v. Automated Medi-
cal Laboratories, Inc .. 770 F.2d 399,406-07 (4th Cir. 1985) (corporation's conviction for falsifying 
documents to a federal agency is upheld where the culpable person-an employee of defendant's 
wholly owned subsidiary-could have intended to provide benefit to defendant by ensuring "lack 
of difficulties with the FDA," even though his conduct also was intended to ensure his own 
advancement). 
106. E.g., Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899,902-04 (2d Cir. 1981) (corporate 
executive who made false representations to a bank in order to secure a corporate loan may not be 
protected by the fiduciary shield where the corporation was a mere shell and his actions, ostensibly 
for the benefit of the corporation, were really for his own benefit); see also Note, Personal Jurisdic-
tion and the Corporate Employee: Minimum Contacts Meet the Fiduciary Shield, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
813 (1986); Sponsler, Jurisdiction Over the Corporate Agent: The Fiduciary Shield, 35 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 349 (1978); Note, The Fiduciary Shield Doctrine: Minimum Contacts in Special Context, 65 
B.U.L. REV. 967 (1985). 
107. E.g., Aranolfv. Albanese, 85 A.D.2d 3, 446 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1982) (shareholders' alle-
gations that corporate purchase of equipment was beneficial to tenant but not to the lessor corpo-
ration and therefore was improper as a gift withstands defendants' motion for summary 
judgment). 
108. E.g., In re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of W.Va., 22 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th 197 
(1977) ("While it is true that [charitable) contributions to local service areas do benefit the commu-
nities served, they also tend to upgrade the company's public image and therefore work more to 
the benefit of the utility and its stockholders than to the benefit of the subscribers."). For a discus-
sion of the appropriate allocation of charitable contributions as between ratepayers and stock-
holders, see City of Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 55 Ohio St. 2d 168, 177-82, 378 N.E.2d 
729, 735-37 (1978) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 (1979). For a commentary on 
the recasting of charitable gestures into instruments for profitability, see Berle, Modern Functions 
of the Corporate System, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 433,444 (1962) (corporate officers "apply the poten-
tial profits or public relations tests later on, a sort of left-handed justification in this curious free-
market world where an obviously moral or decent or humane action has to be apologized for on 
the ground that, conceivably, you may somehow make money by it."). 
109. E.g., Betson v. Commissioner, 802 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1986) (physician's ad-
vances of funds on behalf of liquor store venture in which he and his wife were the sole sharehold-
ers were primarily intended to benefit the corporation rather than the taxpayer and therefore are 
not deductible against his personal income; the benefit was "to provide operating capital and 
perpetuate or revitalize the liquor operations carried on by" the corporation). 
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porate opportunity.U 0 The inquiry in each of these contexts may be 
cast in precisely the same terms as the inquiry applicable under the exec-
utive lending statutes: whether an actor's conduct benefited, or was rea-
sonably intended to benefit, the corporation or whether in fact it bene-
fited, or was intended to benefit, solely the actor. Accordingly, the 
courts' identification of corporate benefits in these non-loan cases sug-
gests parameters by which one can judge the existence of a corporate 
benefit in executive lending situations. 
According to these non-loan cases, a corporation is "benefited" 
when (1) its share value is increased; (2) the market share of its products 
is increased; (3) its association with valued suppliers and/or customers 
is strengthened; (4) its productivity is improved; or (5) its "public im-
age" is polished. 
A corporation is not benefited when (1) considering all intangible 
as well as out-of-pocket expenses the cost to the corporation of its ac-
tion exceeds whatever benefits it has received; or (2) the net benefit is 
infinitesimal. 
As an initial proposition, directors ought not to authorize loans 
which do not lead to one of the "beneficial" consequences found in 
these cases. 111 This proposition may argue too much, given the possi-
bility that other potential benefits may be identified, but these guide-
lines provide a sound starting position. Absent the special considera-
tions discussed in the following sections of this Article, the foregoing 
enumeration of corporate benefits ought to form the benchmark from 
which all executive lending decisions are made. 
B. Executive Loans as an Element of Compensation 
One may divide executive loans into two categories, based upon 
the lender's general purpose in making the loans. First are those loans 
made as a compensation substitute or, more accurately, a "compensa-
tion adjunct." Corporations making loans in this category lend credit 
to enable executives to purchase homes or stock, or pay personal bills, 
for example, rather than raising their salary in order to enable them to 
110. See generally Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. 
L. REv. 997 (1981). The question in corporate opportunity cases is posed in terms of the existence 
or nonexistence of a corporate "asset" rather than of a corporate "benefit," but the problem is 
clearly analogous to that posed in the loan cases. 
Ill. Loans which might satisfy the benefit standards articulated in the non-loan cases 
would include loans made to support a supplier whose expansion is necessary to provide the cor-
poration with necessary materials; loans made to permit acquisition of property leasable by the 
corporation in order to facilitate production or distribution; loans made to enable an advertising 
agency to acquire state-of-the-art production equipment in order to prepare effective corporate 
advertisements. 
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do so on their own. 112 Second are those loans made in connection with 
and in order to facilitate some transaction in which both the corpora-
tion and the executive are parties. These loans can be considered 
"transaction adjuncts." 
Many directors would argue that the appropriate test for executive 
loans in the first category should be the test applied to other compensa-
tion decisions: whether the intended recipient of the loan is likely to 
"repay" its value by enhanced loyalty and performance.U 3 Certainly 
from the executive's point of view, this would be the most favorable 
characterization of executive loans. Traditionally, executive compensa-
tion arrangements are virtually unassailable in the absence of a showing 
that they constitute waste. 114 Short of abuse at that level, regardless of 
their generosity, compensation schemes are assumed to serve a valid 
business purpose and hence generally resist shareholder challenge. 115 
But characterizing as mere components of a total executive com-
pensation package those executive loans intended to serve as a compen-
sation adjunct, although it undoubtedly would simplify the inquiry, 
would be an inappropriate reading of the loan enabling statutes. If the 
legislature intended executive loans to be treated as matters of compen-
sation, presumably the enabling provision would have been stated more 
broadly or indeed combined with other provisions relating to compen-
sation.U6 Rather, loan enabling statutes in every state stand separate 
from compensation provisions, and articulate a specific standard for 
112. Professors Brudney and Clark have suggested that compensation adjuncts are inap-
propriate, at least in the context of publicly held corporations. "There is no need for covert addi-
tions to the officers' compensation either to induce them to contribute their best efforts to the firm 
or to treat them fairly." Brudney & Clark, supra note 110, at 1023. 
113. See Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 163, 160 A.2d 731, 737 (Del. 1960) ("All stock 
option plans must be tested against the requirement that they contain conditions, or that sur-
rounding circumstances are such, that the corporation may reasonably expect to receive the con-
templated benefit from the grant of the options."). This concept was perhaps taken to an extreme 
in Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), when the court approved the exten-
sion by Exxon of substantial benefits to its executives (including some already retired), opining: 
"Exxon receives a benefit ... because the next chief executive officer is likely to work that much 
harder believing and trusting that when his retirement is imminent, the granting committees will, if 
necessary, deal with him in equal fairness .... " /d. at 1156. 
))4. See cases collected in D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 59-62 (1986); AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS§ 5.03 re-
porter's comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 5, Apr. )5, 1986) [hereinafter ALJ PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE No. 5J. 
115. See, e.g., discussion of golden parachute arrangements in D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. 
RADIN, supra note 114, at 170-78; Note, Golden Parachutes, Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 955, 962, 964-66 (1987). 
116. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT§ 8.11 ("the board of directors may fix 
the compensation of directors"); that provision is understood to be governed by REVISED MODEL 
BusiNESS CORP. AcT§ 8.30(a) ("A director shall discharge his duties as a director ... in good faith; 
with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circum-
stances; and in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation."). 
HeinOnline -- 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 263 1988
1988:237 Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers 263 
approval not found in those provisions. By the plain expression embod-
ied in its terms, the statutory "benefit" requirement surely must mean 
something more than the absence of waste. 117 
Nonetheless some loans i:nade as compensation adjuncts should be 
judged by a more liberal standard than others. Many loans made as 
compensation adjuncts advance legitimate and specific corporate pur-
poses. Home relocation loans, if made at reasonable rates and security, 
easily fit this category, as do home repurchase agreements, another 
compensation adjunct. An employee will be more willing to accept a 
company-directed transfer knowing that the disruptions inherent in 
finding and purchasing a new home and disposing of the old one will be 
eased. Loans made to facilitate the purchase of stock, or payment of 
personal financial obligations, college expenses or income taxes, on the 
other hand, do not advance specific corporate purposes. 118 
In short, treating executive loans simply as another form of com-
pensation, as most directors apparently do, invokes too broad a stan-
dard of discretion and review. Directors contemplating approval of a 
loan made as a compensation adjunct must further articulate the spe-
cific corporate purpose sought to be advanced by the loan. Some gener-
alized notion of "performance incentive" ought not to be sufficient. 
C. Loans Made To Facilitate Transactions 
Executive loans made in connection with a corporate transaction, 
such as the sale of corporate property or the purchase of services from a 
director's independent business venture, present different analytical 
problems than loans made solely as compensation adjuncts. These 
loans are adjuncts for conflict of interest transactions, a historically dis-
117. Some compensation experts would suggest that executive loans may necessarily gen-
erate a corporate benefit by enhancing performance. Some recent studies have suggested, for ex-
ample, that "the pay and performance of top executives are strongly and positively related." M ur-
phy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get, 64 HARV. Bus. REv .• Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 
I 25 . That is, as the rate of increase in executive compensation rises, so does the rate of increase in 
the corporation's return on investment. /d. at 126 exhibit I. Unfortunately these findings do not 
indicate the causal relationship between the variables. That is, it is equally plausible that compen-
sation rises over time because corporate performance has improved as it is that corporate perform-
ance has improved because compensation has risen. Some studies have suggested that corporate 
performance (as measured by stock price) increases merely because a company adopts a perform-
ance-based compensation plan, without regard to any managerial actions subsequently taken. 
Tehranian & Waegelein, Market Reaction to Short-Term Executive Compensation Plan Adoption, 7 
J. AccT. & EcoN. 131 (1985); Brickley, Bhagat & Lease, The Impact of Long-Range Managerial 
Compensation Plans on Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. AccT. & EcoN. I 15 (1985). 
Moreover, other studies have shown quite different results, including findings that "per-
formance correlates weakly with pay" and that it correlates "not at all." Loomis, The Madness of 
Executive Compensation, FORTUNE, July 12, 1982, at 42, 44. 
I I 8. On the subject ofloans made to facilitate share purchases, see i'!fra notes I 27-30 and 
accompanying text. 
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favored species. 119 Accordingly, they must be subjected to stricter scru-
tiny than loans made as compensation adjuncts and the standard for 
finding some corporate benefit attendant to such loans must be higher. 
Conflict of interest transactions, whether under state safe harbor 
statutes 120 or common law, 121 are subject to a "fairness" or "arm's 
length" standard of approval and review. This standard was articulated 
in its most-quoted form by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pepper v. 
Litton: 122 
[T]he burden is on the director ... not only to prove the good 
faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness 
from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested 
therein .... The essence of the test is whether or not under all 
the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an 
arm's length bargain. 123 
Application of the arm's length standard to executive loans may be 
inappropriate for several reasons. Initially, there is the semantic distinc-
tion between a transaction which is merely "fair" to a corporation and 
one which is affirmatively "beneficial." 124 More significant is the lack in 
119. Marsh, supra note 29, at 36-43. 
120. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ I0-2A-63 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 10-041 (1956); CAL. 
CORP. CoriE § 310 (West 1977); CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 7-5-114.5 (1986); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 33-
323 (West 1987); DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 607.124 (West 1977); GA. 
CODE ANN.§ 14-2-155 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 415-41 (1985); IDAHO CODE§ 30-1-41 (1980 & 
Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.60 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-1-35-2 
(Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 496A.34 (West 1986); KANSAS STAT. ANN.§ 17-6304 (1981); KY. 
REv. STAT. ANN.§ 271A.205 (MichiejBobbs-Merrill 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12:84 (West 
1983); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 717 (1964); Mo. CoRPS. & AssN's CODE ANN.§ 2-419 
(1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 450.2545 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 302A.255 (West 
1985); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 78.140 (Michie 1986); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 21-2040.01 (1943); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN.§ 78.140 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 293-A:41 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 
14A:6-8 (West 1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 713 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 55-30 
(1982); N.D. CENT. CooE § 10-19.1-51 (1985); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 1701.60 (Anderson 1985); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1030 (West 1986); OR. Bus. CoRP. AcT§ 86 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAws§ 
7.1.1-37.1 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 33-13-160 (Law. Co-op 1987); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 48-1-816 
(1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. II,§ 1888 (1984); VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-691 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN.§ 23A.08.435 (West Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE§ 31-1-25 (1982); WIS. STAT.§ 180.355 (1985-
1986); WYO. STAT.§ 17-1-136.1 (1986). 
121. See generally Note, When Must a Transaction Between a Corporation and Its Direc-
tors be Fair and Reasonable? An Analysis of Conflict of Interest Statutes, II WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
199, 217-24 (1985); Note, Section 21-2040.01: Interested Director Transactions and Considerations 
of Fairness, 58 NEB. L. REV. 909,920-22 (1979); Bulbulia and Pinto, Statutory Responses to Inter-
ested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
20 I, 224 (1977). 
122. 308 u.s. 295 (1939). 
123. I d. at 306-07. 
124. This may well be an unduly precious distinction. Current notions of "fairness" en-
compass notions of "benefit." See ALl PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE No. 5, supra note 
114, § 5.02(a)(2)(A) comment ("In determining whether to enter into a transaction, the corporate 
decision maker who approves the transaction should consider not only whether the transaction will 
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many conflict of interest transactions of appropriate referents. The 
arm's length formulation assumes that the board (or a reviewing court) 
is able to ~valuate the transaction in question by reference to compara-
ble transactions, which is not always possible125 or appropriate. Em-
ploying this approach in the case of an executive loan would require 
directors to consider (1) whether tlie corporation would make the loan 
if the borrower were someone other than a manager or (2) whether 
some independent lender would make the loan to the manager on com-
parable terms. 
Both of the necessary referents may exist where a corporation con-
templates granting a purchase money mortgage to a corporate execu-
tive acquiring corporate property. 126 Neither may exist where the pur-
pose of the loan is to facilitate the bail-out of a manager's failing 
business. Where the proffered loan represents an investment in a sepa-
rate business venture owned or controlled by the corporate executive, 
the banking referent is inappropriate because it does not take into ac-
count the costs of the executive's divided loyalty and possible misap-
propriation of corporate opportunity, nor does it recognize the sub-
stantially higher costs to a corporation not otherwise in the lending 
business of maintaining, keeping records for and collecting loan ac-
counts. Even where the loan involves the sale of corporate property, the 
banking referent fails to account for the value of forgone cash which 
would have been available to the corporation had a conventional lender 
provided purchase financing. Simple numerical comparisons of compa-
rable undertakings, assuming they are possible, can be misleading and 
can easily mask preferential treatment of executives which provides no 
independent benefit to the corporation. 
Executive loans made as transaction adjuncts should be thought of 
as involving two analytical steps: first, the transaction itself must be 
evaluated on fairness grounds (for example, is the purchase price for the 
corporate property being sold adequate and is sale of the property ben-
eficial to the corporation?), and second, the facilitating loan must be 
independently evaluated to see if it provides some incremental, addi-
be fair to the corporation as measured by comparison with an arm's length transaction with an 
unrelated third party, but whether the transaction affirmatively will be in the corporation's best 
interest, as in a transaction with an unrelated party. For example, the purchase of a parcel of 
property by the corporation from a director may be at a fair price, but the corporate deci-
sionmaker should also determine that it is beneficial to the corporation to acquire the property for 
its business."). This has been referred to as a "two-tier standard of fairness." Note, Interested 
Director Transactions and Considerations of Fairness, supra note 121, at 909. 
. · 125. Cf. Note, When Must a Transaction Between a Corporation and Its Directors be Fair 
and Reasonable?, supra note 121 at 220-21. 
126. Use of the "in-house" referent should be limited to cases in which there have actually 
been comparable arm's length transactions involving corporate loans to third parties. Hypotheti-
cal referents present a risk of legerdemain which can only exacerbate, and not solve, the problems 
presented by the ambiguity of the benefit standard. 
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tional benefit (for instance, appreciable acceleration of the closing or 
creation of a tax savings). 
D. Loans Made to Facilitate Share Purchases 
Whether one starts from an enumeration of court-recognized cor-
porate benefits, or analogizes to comparable non-loan transactions, the 
preceding discussion does not accorruriodate executive loans made to 
facilitate the purchase of shares or the exercise· of a stock option-col-
lectively the most frequent justification in the Dean Witter sample for 
making an executive loan. These loans cannot be said to advance a spe-
cific, articulable corporate purpose (as is necessary in the case of com-
pensation adjuncts) nor do they facilitate necessary corporate transac-
tions (as in the case of transaction adjuncts). And yet they proliferate 
and presumably are thought to provide some benefit. 
Many theoreticians have suggested that a business enterprise re-
ceives a substantial benefit when its managers are also substantial 
equity owners, so that share ownership should be encouraged. A 1975 
study indicated that "an increase in average [managerial] stockholdings 
from $100,000 to $1 million raises the firm's rate of return by 1.7 per-
cent with a further increase of 0.5 percent if stockholdings rise to $2 
million." 127 A more recent study suggests that the value of a corpora-
tion rises when it adopts a compensation plan which increases manag-
ers' ownership interests. 128 In addition, there is some suggestion that 
significant managerial stock ownership may provide an important 
means of tempering the "agency problem." 129 If one accepts these 
premises, then executive loans made for the purpose of facilitating 
share purchases or the exercise of stock options satisfy the statutory 
"benefit" requirement. 130 
127. Stano, Executive Ownership Interests and Corporate Performance, 42 S. EcoN. J. 272-
78 (1975). quoted in R. POSNER & K. Scorr, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES 
REGULATION 38 (1980). 
128. Brickley, Bhagat & Lease, supra note 117, at 126. Other studies have refined this 
discussion of the relationship between managerial share ownership and corporate performance. 
See. e.g., Flath & Knoeber, Managerial Shareholding, 34 J. INDUS. EcoN. 93 (1985). Ironically, 
corporate managers themselves have argued, in response to shareholder proposals that outside 
directors maintain some minimum shareholdings, that "an individual's contributions to the busi-
ness's success have no relation to the number of shares held .... " Muckley, Dear Fellow Share-
owner, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 46, 58. 
129. Bcnston, The Self Serving Management Hypothesis-Some Evidence, 7 J. AccT. & 
EcoN. 67, 82 (1985). 
130. On the other hand, one wonders whether, if the aim is to increase share ownership, a 
generous stock option plan really requires the additional incentive of a facilitating loan. Where the 
option has substantial value, it is doubtful that many corporate managers would forgo their right 
to exercise it rather than arrange their own alternative financing. Moreover, one intuitively sus-
pects that the existence of the option provides just as strong an incentive to increase share value as 
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E. Thinking About Risk 
Only a handful of the corporations in the Dean Witter sample 
which disclosed the making of executive loans made any reference to 
security against the possibility of default. 131 This is due, in part, to the 
limitations of SEC disclosure requirements 132 but also reflects a funda-
mental shortcoming in the statutory authorization pursuant to which 
the loans were made, and a recurring flaw in the way in which directors 
make executive lending decisions. 
The executive loan enabling statutes, by focusing solely on the pu-
tative benefits of such loans, have failed to consider, and failed to re-
quire that corporate executives consider, the countervailing risks in-
volved in making loans. These risks traditionally include, inter alia, 
borrower illiquidity, inadequate collateralization, inclination to de-
fault, and volatility of the economy. These factors collectively make up 
the "Three C's of Credit" in the lending industry. 133 Financial institu-
tions whose business it is to make loans tend to insulate themselves 
against these risks. Indeed, national banks are statutorily precluded 
from engaging in precisely the sorts of loans stimulated by the corpo-
rate executive loan enabling acts. Banks are subject to per person lend-
ing limits. 134 They are restricted in the amount of funds they can lend 
does actual ownership of the shares. So the costs to the corporation of making and overseeing the 
loan may exceed the marginal benefit of having done so. 
131. Air Express lnt'l Corp., Proxy Staiement, at 9 (May 15, 1987) (loan secured by 
shares purchased); Avalon Corp., Proxy Statement, at II (May 14, 1987) (loan secured by second 
mortgage on borrower's resid!:nce); Carolco Pictures, Inc., Proxy Statement, at 6 (May 22, 1987) 
(loans secured by borrowers' personal residence); Fluorocarbon Co., Proxy Statement, at 4 (May 
5, 1987) (loans secured by trust deeds on the borrowers' residences); Gemcraft, Inc., Proxy State-
ment, at 15 (May 26, 1987) (loan to joint venture of which the company's Chairman and CEO was 
a partner personally guaranteed by him); Gerber Energy lnt'l, Inc., Proxy Statement, at II (May 
22, 1987) (loan secured by Stock); Michaels Stores, Inc., Proxy Statement, at 12 (May 20, 1987) 
(loan secured by stock); Pratt'Hotel Corp., Proxy Statement, at II (May 4, 1987) (loan secured by 
a first mortgage on the borrower's residence); Ross Stores, Inc., Proxy Statement, at 19 (May 14, 
1987) (loan ~ecured by a deed of trust on the borrower's home). 
One court has suggested in dictum that any unsecured loan to a corporate executive ought 
to be considered "unfair" as a matter of law. Washington Nat'l Trust Co. v. W.M. Dary Co., 116 
Ariz. 171, 174-75,568 P.2d 1069, 1072-73 (1977). 
132. See supra notes 56 and 74. 
133. They are Character, Capacity and Capital. Bryan, The Banker and The Credit Deci-
sion, in BANK CREDIT 2 (H. Prochnow ed. 1981). 
134. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (Supp. 1987). See Glidden, National Bank Lending Limits and the 
Comptroller's Regs: A Clarification, 101 BANKING L. J. 430 (1984); Glidden, National Bank Lend-
ing Limits: Interpretive Issues and Practical Considerations, 101 BANKING L. J. 554 (1984). The 
historical origins of federal bank lending limits are unclear, but apparently one of the reasons for 
adoption of institutional limits when the national banking system was established in 1863 was the 
need to diversify risk. Glidden, A Clarification, supra, at 432. One court has opined that the lending 
limit was "[a] rule laid down from experience to regulate [the bank's]loans for its own best interest 
and those of its stockholders and creditors, not a rule to regulate its customers .... The intention 
[was] to protect the association and its stockholders and creditors from unwise banking .... " 
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to enterprises controlled by the same persons who control the bank. 135 
They are specifically limited in the amount of money they can lend (or 
credit they can extend) personally to their own officers, directors and 
principal shareholders, and strictly confined with respect to the terms 
upon which they may do so. 136 National banking associations cannot 
make loans secured by their own stock. 137 Surely these provisions and 
the prophylactic purposes which they serve suggest that similar restric-. 
tions might be appropriate in cases in which non-bank lenders with no 
expertise in lending have been authorized to make loans. 
It is true that limitations on executive lending similar to those im-
posed on banks can be built into a corporation's articles or by-laws. 138 
And directors contemplating approval of an executive loan are always 
well-advised to give careful thought to traditional credit 
considerations. 139 
O'Hare v. Second Nat'l Bank, 77 Pa. 96, 102-03 (1874), quoted in Valente v. Dennis, 437 F.·Supp. 
783, 786 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
135. 12 U.S.C. § 37lc (Supp. 1987); 12 C.F.R. § 215 (1987). These enterprises may include 
corporations "controlled" by the bank executives, 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(k) (1987), and partnerships 
in which the bank executives are partners, 12 C.F.R. § 215.5 (1987). ' 
136. 12 U.S.C. § § 375a (1978 & Supp. 1987), 375b (Supp. 1987); 12 C.F.R. § 215 (1987). 
See Annotation, Construction and Application of Statutes Prohibiting or Limiting Loans to Bank's 
Officers or Directors, 49 A.L.R. 3d 727 (1973). Significant loans to bank executives must be ap-
proved in advance by the disinterested members of the bank's board, 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(b) (l)(i) 
(1987), and information about many executive loans must be disclosed in regulatory reports, 12 
C.F.R. § 215.9 (1987), or upon request from the public, 12 C.F.R. § 215.10 (1987). 
137. 12 u.s.c. § 83 (1987). 
138. Scott, supra note 35, at 292 ("Where special circumstances require, as in the protec-
tion of minority interests, an appropriate limitation in the articles of incorporation or in the by-
laws can accomplish the objective."). 
139. An example of a carefully crafted loan policy was reflected in the most recent proxy 
statement of The Wholesale Club, Inc. In its disclosure of various compensation plans, the com-
pany described its Employee Loan Program, adopted by the board in 1985, for the purpose of 
facilitating the exereise of stock options. Under this plan: 
(T]he loans may be made for a term not to exceed 36 months and at a rate of 
interest not less than the prime lending rate established from time to time by the Indiana 
National Bank. 
No advancement or loan may be made to an employee under the Loan Program 
for the purpose of exercising any option under the Company's Executive Incentive Stock 
Option Plan. Moreover, any advancement or loan to an employee under the Loan Pro-
gram for the purpose of exercising any option under the Company's Incentive Stock 
Option Plan must bear interest at a rate at least equal to the rate established by the 
Internal Revenue Service and then in effect under applicable federal income tax laws. 
The Loan Program imposes additional restrictions on lending to officers and Di-
rectors. No loan may be made if the total outstanding balance of all loans exceeds 5% of 
the market value of the outstanding shares of the Company. Other than this limit on the 
maximum aggregate outstanding balance of all loans made by the Company, there is no 
ceiling amount that can be lent to any individual officer or Director, or to all officers and 
Directors as a group. In addition, the Company may not deliver a stock certificate to the 
purchaser until any corresponding loan has been repaid in full. 
Proxy Statement, at 8 (statement for meeting on June 9, 1987). 
Another example appears in the Baxter Travenol Proxy Statement: 
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But considerations of risk seem to have eluded the loan-making 
directors in many companies represented in the Dean Witter sample. 
This may prove especially unfortunate in the event of an economic re-
versal. Even with the statutory limitations imposed on banks, they have 
in recent months experienced substantial losses as a result of making 
injudicious executive loans, as have thrifts and credit unions which are 
less well-regulated. Just a glance at the recent well-publicized institu-
tional closures or receiverships at Vernon Savings & Loan in Texas/ 40 
Old Court Savings & Loan and Merritt Commercial Savings & Loan in 
Maryland, 141 United American Bank in Tennessee, 142 Commonwealth 
Savings in Nebraska, 143 FirstSouth FSB in Arkansas, 144 Penn Square 
Bank in Oklahoma 145 and the Alaska Teamsters Federal Credit Union 
in Alaska, 146 all of which have been attributed in substantial part to the 
presence of excessive insider loans, helps one fully appreciate the degree 
to which freewheeling executive lending practices can bring ruin to the 
interests of shareholders and creditors. 
The relationship between excessive insider loans and business fail-
ure is more than anecdotal. A recent study of 1,000 banks has indicated 
that excessive insider loans are a "major warning sign that a bank may 
eventually fail." 147 All of this suggests that directors approaching the 
In February, I 985, the board of directors authorized the Company to loan funds 
to the Company's executive officers. The amount loaned to any executive could not ex-
ceed the executive's base salary for I 985. Authority to make the loans expired at May I, 
1985. Loans are repayable on demand by the Company (but not later than February, 
I 988) and bear interest at a rate determined at the end of each calendar quarter, equal to 
the rate on the Company's 30-day commercial paper. 
Proxy Statement, at I 3 (Mar. 27, I 987). 
140. Texas S & L Disasters are Blamed, in Part, on Freewheeling Style, Wall St. J., July 13, 
1987, at I, col. 6. 
141. See FourS & L Officials Indicted in Insider Loan Probe: $45 Million Scheme at Mer-
ritt Alleged, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1987, at BJ, col. 5. 
142. Butcher Scandal Snares Another, AM. BANKER, June 8, 1987, at 20. 
143. On Trial-Impeachment in Nebraska: An AG in Court-as Defendant, NAT'L. L.J. 
Apr. 23, I 984, at 6. 
144. See Boom to Bust in Arkansas, Wash. Post, Aug. 30, I 987, at HI, H6 ("Hundreds of 
millions of dollars worth of insider loans were in default when the institution failed. FirstSouth's 
biggest stockholders became its biggest debtors."). 
145. P. ZWEIG, BELLY UP: THE COLLAPSE OF THE PENN SQUARE BANK 83, 187, 196,265-66, 
412 (1985); M. SINGER, FUNNY MONEY 105-06, I 10, 192 (1985). 
146. Regulator Charges Fraud in Suit Against Ex-Head of Alaska Credit Union, AM. 
BANKER, June I I, 1987, at 18, col. 4. 
147. Study Shows Insider Loans May Signal Failure, AM. BANKER, July 9, I 987, at 3, col. 
2. This study did not find that excessive insider loans are the direct cause of bank failures, but 
rather that the management style which permits the liberal extension of credit to bank executives 
also may encourage poor business practices elsewhere. Lawrence, Kummer & Arshadi, Inside Bor-
rowing Practices of Commercial Banks, I I IssuES BANK REG. 28 (I 987). Statistics developed by the 
authors indicate that "high insider borrowing banks" have higher Joan losses, larger operating 
expenses, greater risk, lower returns on equity and a greater failure rate than "low or medium 
borrowing banks." D. Kummer, N. Arshadi, & E. Lawrence, Valuation Consequences of Bank 
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question of whether to authorize an executive loan ought to do so with 
a presumption against authorization, absent a compelling corporate in-
terest to the contrary. 
IV. RETHINKING THE ENABLING ACTS 
A. Differential Treatment of Inside and Outside Directors 
The states have made various attempts to balance the perceived 
need to make loans available to corporate executives against the need to 
protect shareholders and creditors from managerial opportunism. 
Some of the solutions reflect contradictory impulses 148 and others a 
surprising willingness to defer financial decisionmaking authority to 
shareholders. 149 
Only two state enabling statutes reflect in simple terms the goals 
initially sought by such statutes: authorization for a corporation to 
make advances of business-related expenses to officer/directors who 
under traditional trust principles would arguably have been disabled 
from receiving this routine employee benefit. 150 The states which retain 
the 1969 MBCA format 151 presumably intended a similar result by au-
thorizing loans to directors who are also employees, but not permitting 
loans to be made to outside directors absent express shareholder ap-
Insider Borrowing 20 (working paper on file at Wisconsin Law Review). They conclude that "in-
sider abuses have contributed to at least one-third of all [bank] failure cases." /d. 
Banks are not the only entities where insider borrowing presages failure. It is not uncom-
mon for businesses of many sorts when seeking protection under Chapter II or liquidating under 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Act to disclose in their required filings that they have permitted 
insider "withdrawals" in the year preceding the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. See II 
U.S.C. Form 8, § 19(b) (Supp. IV 1986) ("If the debtor is a partnership or corporation, what 
withdrawals, in any form (including compensation, bonuses, or loans) have been made or received 
by any member of the partnership, or by any officer, director, insider, managing executive, or 
shareholder of the corporation, during the year immediately preceding the filing of the original 
petition herein?"). 
148. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 351.165 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (corporation not 
permitted to make loans to any shareholder to facilitate the purchase of shares) with IND. CoDE 
ANN.§ 23-1-2-18 (Burns 1984) (repealed effective Aug. I, 1987) (loans available only to facilitate 
the purchase of shares). 
149. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix I. 
150. In addition to their "benefit" statutes setting standards for board approval of execu-
tive loans. Minnesota and North Dakota also have very practical statutes authorizing routine 
loans without the necessity of board approval. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 302A.505 (West 1985): N.D. 
CENT. CoDE§ 10-19.1-90 (1985) ("A corporation may, without a vote of the directors, advance 
money to its directors, officers or employees to cover expenses that can reasonably be anticipated 
to be incurred by them in the performance of their duties and for which they would be entitled to 
reimbursement in the absence of an advance."). Presumably many corporations in other states 
make these advances without directoral approval and without recognizing that they are, in a strict 
sense, illegal loans. 
151. See supra note 36. These states include Alabama. Arizona, Idaho, Iowa. Kentucky, 
Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, West Virginia and Wyoming. 
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proval. Even the Delaware General Corporation Law focuses on loans 
to "officer[s] or other employee[s]," excluding from its liberal coverage 
outside directors. 152 
This discrimination against outside directors may appear innocu-
ous, if one assumes loans are made only for business-related expenses, 
but in fact it is problematical where loans are made (as is common) for 
nonbusiness-related purposes. If a contemplated loan is beneficial to 
the lending corporation, then why should the state by requiring proxy 
solicitation (as is the case of those states r~taining the 1969 MBCA for-
mat) impose a substantially higher transaction cost solely because of 
the borrower's role in the enterprise?153 Moreover, if as a regulatory 
gesture a higher transaction cost is to be imposed, it would seem more 
reasonably applicable to loans made to inside directors (who, because 
of their access to information concerning opportunities to do so, are 
more likely to abuse their relationship with the corporation and whose 
opportunity for self-reward in the absence of disclosure to shareholders 
is essentially undetectable )154 than those made to outside directors 
(who are assumed to be "independent" of management). 155 A better 
formula, and that adopt!!d in the Revised.Model Business Corporation 
Act, 156 would delete any distinctio~ between directors who are and 
those who are not officers or employees. 
152. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (1983). The Delaware format is shared by Florida, 
Kansas, Maryland, Michigan and Oklahoma. 
California's statute also stresses the borrowing needs of inside directors. Although requiring 
generally that executive loans be authorized by the shareholders, California permits those corpo-
rations with 100 or more shareholders, which have adopted an appropriate by-law, to make loans 
to officers, whether or not they are also directors, by board approvaL CAL. CORP. CoDE§ 325(b) 
(West 1988). Arkansas recognizes that loans to employees may promote good employer-employee 
relationships, but nevertheless declines to authorize loans to employees who are officers, directors 
or 10% shareholders. ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 4-26-204(b)(3) (1987) (applicable to corporations formed 
before Dec. 31, 1987). 
153. The states using the Delaware fon~at present a somewhat different problem. By 
casting the loan enabling statues in terms of the borrowing needs of corporate "employees," these 
states have left ambiguous the borrowing rights of, and the standard of care applicable to,loans to 
outside directors. 
154. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
155. Outside directors may have other·perquisites available to them, including annual 
retainers, substantial per-meeting fees; retirement plans based upon age or years of service as a 
director; life insurance; "consulting" agreements and deferred compensation plans. Muckley, 
supra note 128, at 46; Barnard, supra note 45, at 376-77. See generallY. HEWITT ASSOCIATES, HIGH-
LIGHTS OF COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR OUTSIDE DIRECTORS IN THE FORTUNE I 00 INDUSTRIALS 
(SEPT. 1987). 
156. See supra note 36. 
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B. Differential Treatment of Public, Non-Public and Close 
Corporations 
Currently, only one state acknowledges that the rules governing 
the making of executive loans might appropriately differ as between 
closely held and publicly held corporations. 157 However, the available 
evidence suggests that executive lending behavior differs greatly de-
pending on the shareholder makeup of the lending corporation, 158 
warranting differential treatment in the enabling statutes. 
For example, one might argue that it is unlikely that opportunistic 
executive borrowing will occur in corporations which are truly publicly 
held, for three reasons-the presence of a monitoring board which in-
cludes outside directors, the inhibiting influence of federal mandatory 
disclosure requirements applicable to most such companies and the 
presence of a sufficient body of subordinate employees who themselves 
may act as a monitoring force against abuse. 159 If this is so, then it 
would not be unreasonable for states to permit, as does California, cor-
porations with one hundred or more shareholders to opt out of provi-
sions requiring shareholder approval of executive loans, as long as the 
board of directors remains bound by a meaningful benefit standard. 160 
At the other end of the spectrum, corporations which are truly 
closely held are likely to be the situs of frequent opportunistic borrow-
ing, 161 but here, it is difficult to discern any appropriate state concern. 
If Mom and Pop want to allocate $10,000 of the corporate resources of 
Mom & Pop, Inc. as a loan to buy themselves a personal automobile or 
a vacation in the south of France, no one, save the IRS and creditors, 
each of whom already has an incentive to monitor and available mecha-
nisms for redress, 162 should be concerned. The statutory "benefit" re-
quirement in these situations seems both superfluous and unduly inva-
157. CAL. CORP. CoDE§ 315(b) (West 1987) (requires shareholder approval of executive 
loans except where there are 100 or more shareholders of record and an authorizing by-law ap-
proved by the shareholders or an employee benefit plan which includes officers, in which case the 
law permits director approval of loans made to officers upon a showing of corporate benefit). 
158. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 45, at 381, Fig. I (43.2% of"pre-public" corporations 
found to have made material executive loans while only 16.7% of public corporations found to 
have done so). 
159. See Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments 
in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 919 (1982). 
160. CAL. CORP. CoDE§ 315(b) (West 1987). There is, however, evidence that market-
based controls are ineffective in deterring opportunistic behavior, even in the largest corporations. 
See supra note 54; Barnard, supra note 45, at 397-402; SEC v. Allegheny lnt'l, Inc., Litigation 
Release No. 11,533, (Sept. 9, 1987); Allegheny International Sued by SEC. Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 
1987, at I 0, col. I. An opt-out provision would particularly disadvantage minority shareholders in 
subsidiary corporations and other corporations subject to substantial control by a dominant 
shareholder or group of shareholders. 
161. See supra notes 52, 53 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra notes 48, 50 and accompanying text. 
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sive of a form of enterprise which is more realistically governed by tax 
considerations than by state corporate law strictures. It would seem 
reasonable, therefore, to permit corporations with five or less share-
holders with unanimous approval to opt out of the benefit requirement. 
It is the corporation in the middle of this spectrum which is most 
likely to engage in executive loan-making behavior requiring state in-
tervention. This category includes those companies not big enough to 
rely on disclosure disincentives or market-based monitoring forces, but 
big enough to have a substantial body of non-management sharehold-
ers essentially uninformed about management conduct and dispropor-
tionately disadvantaged by the existence of management self-deal-
ing. 163 It is to these corporations especially that state regulation of 
executive lending should be addressed. 
C. The "Subterfuge" Issue 
No state statute addresses the subterfuge issue which troubled Pro-
fessor Jennings, 164 purporting only to regulate loans made to officers 
and/or directors personally, but not those made to their family mem-
bers or entities controlled by them. Thus, while states may limit the 
making ofloans to corporate directors; they do not limit loans to direc-
tors' spouses, or offspring, or partnerships in which they are general 
partners or even corporations of which they are sole shareholders. Pre-
sumably, those transactions are governed by other statutory conflict of 
interest provisions, 165 but the executive loan enabling statutes would 
better fulfill their intended purpose if, as some non-loan conflict of in-
terest provisions do, 166 they expressly included within their purview at 
least the immediate family members of officers and directors. 
D. The Needfor Disclosure 
As noted at the outset, statutory limitations on executive lending 
were initially thought to serve the dual purposes of protecting share-
holders and protecting creditors. 167 It is arguable that today the latter 
purpose is adequately served by contractual arrangement and existing 
creditors' remedies, so that only the former purpose continues to re-
163. Dean Knauss has argued that "(i)t is for this group of companies ... -those that are 
not close corporations but that do not have publicly traded securities-that the procedural and 
organizational state corporations laws are most needed." Knauss, The Problems of Smaller Public 
. Corporations, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 141, 144 (D. 
Schwartz ed. 1979). 
164. See supra note 2. 
165. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
166. See CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 33-323 (1959). 
167. See supra note 4. 
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quire state attention. One might thus urge that, in addition to imposing 
a benefit standard on the directors, state law ought to require manda-
tory disclosure to shareholders of such executive loans as are approved 
pursuant to that standard. Indeed, in the absence of disclosure any pro-
cedural limitation on executive loans may be meaningless. 
Disclosure of this sort of information is not costly to make. 168 It 
would be a natural addition to existing shareholder informational enti-
tlements. It would provide a specific· means of enforcing the benefit 
standard where market forces have failed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It has been twenty years since the Delaware legislature, racing to 
the bottom in classic form, 169 led the way in encouraging directors to 
make executive loans virtually unconstrained. Even though executive 
lending was known then and for decades had been known to be an "ex-
tremely dangerous practice," 170 this managerial perquisite proved irre-
sistible. State after state has jumped on the train with enabling legisla-
tion and, for lack of an effective policing mechanism, such 
inappropriate loans as resulted have for the most part escaped sanction. 
This Article does not suggest a return to the days when all execu-
tive loans were prohibited, but rather suggests that the current statu-
tory approach to executive loans has resulted in several undesirable 
consequences. This approach permits the diversion of corporate re-
sources to nonproductive or at least non-optimizing uses; it encourages 
the overcompensation of certain executives; it creates a license for man-
agers to use their businesses as private lending sources at will, without 
disclosure to shareholders, a practice which can lead to other failures of 
financial control; it permits resort to the business judgment rule as a 
defense to misappropriation. · 
A cautious regulatory approach to problems such as these might 
encompass the following conditions: 
No loan shall be made by a corporation to any officer, 
director, shareholder ot employee of the corporation or any 
member of such person's immediate family, or to any entity 
controlled by that person, except: 
A. Advances made for reimbursable expenses incurred 
in carrying on the business of the corporation. 
B. Loans made pursuant to a plan, previously ap-
proved by a majority of the shareholders, to facilitate employ-
168. Barnard, supra note 45, at 402-09. 
169. Cf Cary, supra note 3, at 666. 
170. Marsh, supra note 29, at 68. 
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ees relocated by the corporation in purchasing a principal 
place of residence. Such plans shall specify a maximum per-
centage of the purchase price of the property. to be acquired 
which will be loaned (not to exceed 80%) and shall require: 
(1) that the corporation receive a first loan lien on the. 
property acquired in the amount of the loan plus accumulated 
interest; 
(2) that the loan bear interest at a ra~e to be dete.rmined at 
the time of each loan which is reasonably related to then ap-
plicable market interest for comparable loans. 
C. Loans made pursuant to a plan, previously ap-
proved by a majority of the shareholders, to facilitate the pur-
chase of shares in the corporation. Such plan shall specify a 
maximum percentage of the fair market value of the shares to 
be acquired which will be loaned (n.ot to.exceed _%)and 
shall require: 
(1) that the corporation shall retain the certificates until 
the loan is repaid with interest in full. 
(2) that the loan bear interest at a rate to be determined at 
the time of each loan which is reasonably related to then ap-
plicable market interestfor comparable loans. 
D. Loans which will otherwise benefit the corporation. 
No loan shall be made pursuant to this paragraph unless: 
(1) It has been approved by a majority of the board of 
directors, excluding any director who is the recipient of or has 
a pecuniary interest in the recipient of any portion of the loan 
funds; 
(2) The resolution proposing the loan shall reveal: 
(a) The person or entity to whom the loan is to be made 
and, if an entity, the names of all officers, directors, employees 
or shareholders of the corporation having an interest in the 
entity; . 
(b) The purpose of the loan, including a specific state-
ment as to the use of the loan proceeds; · 
(c) A statement explaining the benefit to the corporation 
which is expected to result from the loan. The mere receipt of 
a market rate of interest on the loan is not benefit for purposes 
of this subparagraph; 
(3) The loan bears a rate of interest which is at least equal 
to the lowest rate of interest at which the corporation bor-
rowed money in the preceding twelve months, or current mar-
ket interest rates, whichever is higher. 
275 
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(4) The loan is secured by property having a readily as-
certainable or appraised value of at least 120% of the loan, or 
is personally guaranteed by a person having a net worth of at 
least four times the amount of the loan as reasonably repre-
sented in a personal financial statement reviewed by the board 
of directors. 
E. Any loan made pursuant to paragraphs B, C or D of 
this section shall be disclosed to the shareholders in the next 
annual report to shareholders following approval of the loan. 
In the case of loans made pursuant to paragraph B or C, such 
disclosure shall include the terms of the loan, including provi-
sions for security, rate of interest and term of the loan. In the 
case of loans made pursuant to paragraph D, disclosure shall 
include the above information plus the text in full of any au-
thorizing resolution passed by the board. 
F. Any corporation with five or less shareholders may, 
upon unanimous vote of the shareholders, waive the require-
ments of this section, on an annual basis. 
G. For purposes of this section, "immediate family" 
shall include a person's spouse, parents, children, siblings, 
mothers- and fathers-in-law, sons- and daughters-in-law and 
brothers- and sisters-in-law. 
H. For purposes of this section, "entity controlled by a 
person" shall include any entity in which that person owns, 
controls or has the power to vote 25% or more of any class of 
voting securities; controls in any manner the election of a ma-
jority of the directors; or of which that person is an officer, 
director or general partner. 
Even if the foregoing is deemed too constraining for a chartering 
state to impose, it provides sound guidance for a corporation entertain-
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2 For corporations incorporated after Dec. 31, 1987 and corporations formed prior thereto which elect coverage under the new Corporations Act. 
3 Loans may be made to directors if either the specific loan or a general plan authorizing loans is approved by the board. 
4 
.If the loan is secured by shares of the corporation. 
s If the corporation has I 00 or more shareholders and a bylaw approved by the shareholders authorizing board approval, loans to officers (even if directors) may be 
approved by disinterested members of the board upon a showing of corporate benefit. 
6 Where the loan is made contrary to provisions of the statute. 
7 Requires a % vote of the shareholders, unless the articles of incorporation dictate otherwise. 
8 Unless the articles specify otherwise. 
9 Permits loans to employees to facilitate share purchases. 
10 Unless a majority of disinterested directors have approved the loan, making a finding of corporate benefit. 
11 Requires a % vote of the shareholders. 
12 Permits advances for expenses. 
13 Prohibits loans to facilitate share purchases, but otherwise permits loans secured by real or personal property. 
14 Loans may be made to directors only if permitted in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws approved by the shareholders, or pursuant to a shareholder-approved 
plan. 





















































APPENDIX II ~ 
Higbest Amount 
State of Outstanding 
Incorporation Company Loan to in 1986 Rate of Interest Purpose 
DE Air Express International Senior V-P $ 98,075 N/D To permit borrower (a 
Corp. foreign national) to 
purchase stock in foreign 
subsidiaries as required by 
foreign law. 1 
AK *Alaska National Bank of Directors & officers 7,374,553 N/D N/D 
the North collectively 
A director 3,284,271 Base rate plus 2-3% For real estate development. 
A director· 1,165,989 Base rate plus I%% For payment of a tax 
liability. 
FL *Ambassador Financial Direetors & executive 1,319,968 Lower than prevailing To finance personal 
Group, Inc. officers collectively interest rates residences. 
MD Americana Hotels and Directors & officers 108,000 N/D Unpaid balance on loans ~ Realty Corp. collectively made in 1984 to permit 
purchase of shares on "an 
-Cll extended payment plan." (j 
A trusi of which· the 9,000,000 .25% below prime N/D 0 
company's chairman is z 
trustee and CEO Cll 
-IN * Ameriana Savings Bank. Directors & officers 369,415 N/D Mortgage and consumer z 
F.S.B. . collectively loans . r 
MD A val on Corp. Senior V-P/COO, 150,000 Prime+%% Loan to facilitate purchase ~ of personal residence (in 
connection with borrower's ~ 
relocation). m 
UT Beehive International Executive V-P/Director 25,000 N/D In connection with < 




























State of OutstaJJdiDg 00 
Incorporation Compsny Loan to inl986 Rate or Interest Purpose 00 N 
CA Bridge Communications, Chairman of Board s \58,715 10% To purchase· stock. w 
-.J 
Inc. 
DE Carolco Pictures. Inc. Co-Chairmen of Board 2.500.000 \0.5% Per'sonal loans. 3 
(each) 
CA The Clothestime, Inc. Vice-President 85,008 10% To exercise opti~ns. 
Key employee 24 i ,000 10% To exercise options·. ~ 
President/CEO 870,000 \0% To exercise options. ~ 
Former key employee 190,008 10% To exercise options. ..:> .., $::) 
ID Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp. Chairman 95,425 Prime+%% N/D4 ... n:. 
President/CEO 101,653 Prime+%% N/D t'-<" 
DE Cytogen Corp. President/CEO 198,000 10% (later reduced to To purchase stock. s ..:> § 6.81%) ~ 
CA6 Datacopy·Corp. President 728,002 N/D To exercise option. 7 
-..:> 
Director 200,215 9% To exercise option. 0 
CA Dest Corp. Officers collectively 135,990 9% This was a cash payment to ::;· 
7 officers "to offset. interest n:. f"l 
due to company under ·loans -..:> 
made by the company .... ·• .., ~ 
FL Devcon International Corp. Chairman 224.000 No interest N/D $::) ;:s 
DE DiGiorgio Corp .. Chairman/CEO 182,721 12% To purchase home. ~ 
Vice-President 59,915 13% To purchase property from ~ the eompany. f"l 
NY The Dreyfus Corp. Officers collectively 529,868 No interest To purchase homes. n:. 
Officers collectively 334,156 9% To exercise stock options. 
~ 
Vice-President & other 59.469 13.65% To exercie stock options. 
officers 
Officer 13.978 10.33% To exercise stock options. 



























Highest Amount 00 
State of Outstanding 0'\ 
Incorporation Company Loan to in 1986 Rate of Interest Purpose 
The Dreyfus Corp. (cont.) Officers $ 277,330 5% To exercise stock options. 
OH Fabri-Centers of America, Executive officers 194,333 No interest "Long-term advances" 
Inc. 298,172 No interest toward purchase of life 
insurance policies, repayable 
out of death benefits. 
NC First Provident Group, Inc. Partnership in which the 200,000 NfD To fund operating deficits. 
issuer's CEO and V-P are 
general partners 
CEO/V-P 34,200 No interest N/D 
CA Flurocarbon Co. Key employees collectively 333,111 No interest To assist in the purchases of 
new residences, pursuant to 
an Employee Relocation 
Assistance Plan, approved 
by the shareholders in 1981. 
DE Gemcraft Co. Chairman 35,000 N/D For partial payment for 
Executive V-P 34,000 purchase of excess inventory ~ Director 36,000 of completed but unsold 
houses. 8 
-en 
"Principal stockholders" 527,000 No interest N/D n 
and various ventures in 0 
which they are principals z 
en 
Joint venture in which a 402,000 12% For acquisition of tract of 
-director of the company is a land. z 
participant t'"' 
NY General Host Corp. Key employee 249,884 4%-6% To purchase shares of the ~ company's stock. 
co Gerber Energy Officer/Director 200,000 12% N/D ~ 
International, Inc. 100,000 9.5% N/D m 
< B.C. Canada Grandview Resources, Inc. A corporation controlled by 137,228 No interest To purchase furniture and 


























Highest Amount 00 00 
State of Outstanding N 
Incorporation Company Loan to in 1986 Rate of Interest Purpose !,;.) 
-.I 
IL *Heritage Financial Services. Directors & their associates $ 7,968.000 N/D N(D 
Inc. & families 
Ml Highland Superstores. Inc. Vice-President 99.095 N(D To purchase a home.9 
NV Horn & Hardart Company Executive V-P 125,000 10% "Personal Joan." ("') 
Vice-Chairman 154,700 10% In connection with his c 
investment in a real estate ~ 
venture which was formed c 
.... 
to purchase a hotel-casino 1::) 
-from the company. ~ 
NY Jamesway Corp. SeniorV-P 17.042 No interest N/D t--o c 
57,470 11.5% N/P 1::) ;:: 
CA • John Adams Life Corp. Officers & directors 2.811,433 N/D N/D (loans against ""' 
-insurance policies issued by c 
the company). ~ 
DE The Liposome Co. Chairman/CEO 3.948 No interest To purchase stock. -· ;;: 
MA Mars Stores. Inc. . Chairman/CEO 420,000 N/D To exercise non-qualified ("") 
-option.10 c ~ 
DE Michaels Stores. Ine. CEO 236,250 6.7% To exercise stock options. 1::) 
34,688 6.4% "In connection with the ;:: !::).. 
payment of certain income ~ tax withholding obligations relating to the exercise of ("") 
stock options." ~ 
36,000 No interest ''Advances." ~ 
Senior V-P 472.000 6.7% To exercise stock options. 
69.375 6.4% In connection with the 
payment of certain income 



























Highest Amount N 
State of Outstanding 00 00 
Incorporation Company Loan to in 1986 Rate of Interest Purpose 
VT Nature's Sunshine Products, President $ 150,003 10% In consideration for the 
Inc. · v-P 62,521 10% officers' agreement with the 
All executive officers 379,147 10% Company rescinding 
as a group previous agreements 
_providing for income tax 
indemnification. 
NY Novo Corp. President 96,000 5.5% For personal obligations. 
DE NPS Technologies Group, President & CEO 335,200 NfD Extension ofcredit for 
Inc. construction of the 
borrower's private residence. 
508,290 N/D Salary advances for amounts 
"needed in conjunction with 
certain personal investment 
requirements.'''' 
CA Occupational-Urgent Care A medical corporation of 182,300 N/D To cover costs which were 
Health Systems, Inc. which the company's in excess of the medical 
chairman is CEO corporation's income. 
ME PEC Israel Economic Corp. Bank holding company of 974.338 LIBR + %% N/D ~ 
which 2 of the company's ..... CZl 
directors are also directors () 
TX Pratt Hotel Corp. Partnership in which the 518,000 N/D To cover operating deficits 0 
company's chairman & and capital improvement· z CZl CEO. vice-chairman & · costs of a hotel-in ..... 
executive V-P are principals connection with the z 
company's sale of the hotel. r 
President 450,000 9% For construction of ~ borrower's personal 
residence. :;:tl 





























-Highest Amount 1.0 
State of Outstanding 00 00 
Incorporation Company Loan to in 1986 Rate of Interest Purpose N 
VJ 
DE Pubco Corp. V-P $ 261,000 No interest Bridge loan to enable -.J 
borrower to complete 
acquisition of a Chicago 
residence prior to the sale of 
his Cleveland residence. 
DE Resorts International. Inc. Executive V-P 600,000 10% To exercise stock option. () c 
Estate of chairman of the 150,431 No interest To defray certain personal 
-ti board expenses until other funds c 
become available to the .... t) 
estate. -~ 
CA Ross Stores, Inc. Executive V-P 200,000 No interest To assist in purchase of a t"-< 
home upon relocation to c t) 
California. ::s 
""' DE *Security Pacific Corp. Directors & officers N/D N/D N/D 
-c Executive officers I ,097,887 10%-8% To exercise stock options. ~ 
Republic of Service Resources Corp. President of subsidiary 28;821 12% N/D 
-· .... Panama ~ ~ 
99,500 No interest For relocation expenses in -c 
connection with his ~ 
promotion and transfer. t) 
::s 
TN Shoney's South. Inc. Corporation of which the 300,000 "Floating with prime" Purchase money mortgage t). 
company's CEO is director for sale of name, concept ~ (and whose son is the and right to operate certain principal owner) restaurants. ~ ~ 
UT Tel Electronics, Inc. President & CEO 39,302 10% Purchase money mortgage ~ 
in connection with sale of 
property. 
11,167 N/D "Expense advances." 
DE Tele-Communications, Inc. (Company with interlocking 32,312,048 7Y.z% N/D 


























Highest Amount IV \0 State o( Outstanding 0 
Incorporation Company Loan to inl986 Rate of Interest Purpose 
Tele-Communications. Inc. Executive officer $ 140.000 10% Relocation to Colorado. 
(cont.) 
DE Texas International Co. Executive V-P 63,134 No interest To purchase home in 
Oklahoma City. 
Director· 7S,OOO 10% To purchase home in 
Oklahoma City. 
PA Transducer Systems,.lnc. President/CEO 141,000 12% (later adjusted To enable the borrower to 
downward) meet personal obligations. 12 
NJ •The Trustcompany Officers .& directors N/D N/D N/D 
Bancorporation 
UT Tseng Labs. Inc. 10% subsidiary also having 234,000 N/D "Advances." 
interlocking directors 
DE United Artists President/CEO 260.000 10% In connection with 
Communications, Inc. borrower's purchase of a 
residence in New York upon 
his relocation from Texas. 
CA Velobind, Inc. President/CEO 240,000 9% To purchase stock. ~ 
-7S,S76 9% To assist borrower in r.n 
purchasing stock and in (") 
acquiring an automobile. 0 z DE Xplor Corp. President N/D N/D To purchase stock . r.n 
NJ Zenith Laboratories. Inc. Senior V-P $ 180,000 No interest "Interest free equity -z 
advances." 
t""" 
* Designates a corpordtion engaged in lending as its primary business. 
1 The Company holds the purchased stock as collateral in connection with the fmancing and treats the loaned funds as investments in the foreign subsidiaries. Since ~ 
"the transactions were carried out to benefit the Company, interest is not assessed for these loans, and the full balance remains outstanding at this time." Proxy ~ Statement, at 9 (May IS, 1987). tTl 2 
"This loan will be forgiven by Beehive in 24 equal monthly installments, commencing with the month in which such loan is made. If [the borrower] voluntarily < terminates his employment with Beehive prior to the expiration of such 24 month period, he will be required to repay the portion of the loan which has not been 

























3 These loans were two of a series which had been granted to the borrowers in recent years. "As of December 31, 1986, the total amount due on all of the above notes 
was $11.892,000 and interest in the amount of$926,000 had accrued on the notes, of which $678,000 had been paid prior to year end . . .. The Company does not 
currently intend to make any further loans." Proxy Statement, at 6 (May 22, 1987). 
" These amounts reflect the amounts outstanding during 1986 of loans made in .1982·, pursuant to a company policy permitting the making of executive loans up to 
$150.000. The company's board of directors terminated that policy effective March 31, 1987. Proxy Statement, at 7 (May 15, 1987). 
5 The loan principal at year end was reduced by $50,000 "in recognition of outstanding services rendered to the Company" by the borrower. In early 1987, the 
company forgave an additional $50,000, and reduced the applicable interest rate .. Proxy Statement, at 14 (May 7, 1987). 
6 At its June 2, 1987, meeting, Datacopy shareholders approved a change in the company's state of incorporation from California to Delaware. 
7 This loan was initially made in 1983, and later amended several times to alter the repayment terms and defer payment of interest. Proxy Statement, at 28-29 (Apr. 30, 
1987). 
8 These loans were made in 1982 and 1983. The company in October 1986 offered to forgive accrued interest and discount the outstanding principal on the notes 
payable by 20%. if the balance was repaid by December 1986. Proxy Statement, at-.14 (May 26, 1987). 
9 $65.472 of this amount was repaid and the remainder was forgiven by the company. Proxy Statement, at 4 (May I I, 1987). 
10 The company will make a bonus payment to the borrower equivalent to .. the interest due on this loan . The company will make any additional loans necessary to cover 
the borrower's tax liability as a result of his exercise of the stock options, and forgive the amount due over a three-year period. Proxy Statement, at 14 (May 8, 1987). 
11 
"No plan has been established for the repayment of these funds, although [the borrower) has agreed to repay such advances upon demand." Proxy Statement, at 10 
(May 16, 1987). . 
12 
"[The· borrower) is in default on the loan to the Company for the principal installment due November 30, 1986, and for interest on the above indebtedness in the 
amount of approximately $18,000 as of March 31, 1987. The Company is considering various courses of action with respect to the amount of the indebtedness in 
default, including requiring [him) to sell shares of the Company's Common Stock owned by him, withholding amounts from his salary and bonus, and renegotiating 
the terms of the loan . ... " Proxy Statement, at 6 (May II, 1987). 
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